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As of November 2001, 203 men sit on Ohio's death row. With the executions of
Wilford Berry on February 19, 1999, Jay D. Scott on June 14, 2001, and John
Byrd, Jr. on February 19, 2002, the death penalty in Ohio is a reality. The
capital defense practitioner representing a client at trial or on appeal must be
prepared to defend his or her client against that reality. To that end, this article
examines the statutory framework within which capital cases are prosecuted
with the express purpose of aiding defense practitioners and improving the
quality of capital representation in Ohio. This article analyzes both the positive
and negative aspects of Ohio's death penalty statute. To meet its twin objects,
practical advice and suggested litigation strategies are intermingled with critical
analysis of the law in Ohio.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a defense practitioner working in the death penalty field, it can feel as
though every state law and every court decision works against your client's
interest. We believe it is a good idea to step back from the battle and take a critical
look at the statutory framework within which capital cases are litigated. For
although the statutory scheme and judicial precedent in Ohio may appear
converse to the capital defendant's interests, the Ohio Revised Code provides
many substantive and procedural protections that are available to the defendant in
a capital case, which we call "the good." Part II identifies and discusses these
protections available to the capital defendant in the Ohio Revised Code. Along
with "the good," however, comes "the bad": constitutionally suspect statutory
provisions, unfavorable statutory revisions, and omissions from Ohio's capital
statute. In Part III, we discuss these problem areas. Finally, adverse or
constitutionally suspect interpretations of Ohio's statute can render the law down
right "ugly." Part IV discusses "the ugly" in Ohio's statutory framework as well
as offering recommendations on how to deal with some of the more hostile
aspects of capital jurisprudence in Ohio.
Through awareness of "the good," "the bad," and "the ugly," we believe
defense practitioners can better serve the interests of their capital clients. By
taking advantage of "the good" and preparing to combat "the bad" and "the ugly,"
defense practitioners can more ably represent their capital clients at trial and in
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post-trial litigation. The purpose of this article is to highlight the important aspects
of Ohio's death penalty statute and to enhance the quality of representation by
defense attorneys at all stages of capital case litigation.
11. OHIO'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE: THE GOOD
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that death penalty states
have broad discretion to define capital crimes and to set up procedures to
implement capital sentencing schemes.' As the Court stated in Spaziano v.
Florida,2 "[t]he Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a
conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its
criminal laws."' This is not to say, however, that death penalty states have free
reign to implement capital sentencing schemes.
States must narrow death-eligible offenders into a subclass of all persons who
commit murder. A valid state sentencing scheme must properly channel the
sentencer's discretion to ensure that the death penalty is applied only to the worst
types of murder and that it is not applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner.4
Such a scheme must also provide for fully individualized sentencing of the
defendant, as "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment... requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death."' Accordingly, a state's sentencing scheme must comport with the Eighth
Amendment's "twin objectives.., of measured, consistent application [of capital
punishment] and fairness to the accused." 6 Other than these two Eighth
Amendment requirements, however, the Supreme Court has placed very few
"substantive limitations on the particular factors that a capital [sentencer] may
consider in determining whether death is appropriate."7
' Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-72
(1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion).
468 U.S. 447 (1984).
3 Id. at 464.
4 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court held that the
sentencer's discretion may not be channeled by imposing the death penalty automatically upon
a guilty verdict of capital murder. 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion).
5 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
6 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1982) (citation omitted); see Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 459-60 (citations omitted).
7 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000 (1983). In addition to constitutional limitations
against "vague sentencing standards" and denial of individualized sentencing by preclusion of
the sentencer's consideration of mitigating factors, the Court noted that a defendant has the right
to "explain or deny" information used to impose the death penalty. Id. at 1000-01 (citing
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With these constitutional principles in mind, we conclude that Ohio's death
penalty statute is essentially favorable to the capital defendant (aside from the
obvious fact that the statute allows the state to impose the death penalty). From
the standpoint of the defense practitioner, Ohio's death penalty statute provides
more substantive and procedural protections to the capital defendant than the
Federal Constitution requires. We discuss these substantive and procedural
protections in this section as they pertain to the topics of death penalty eligibility
factors, death penalty selection factors and procedures, jury participation in capital
sentencing, available life sentences, and the function of appellate review of capital
sentences.
A. Eligibility Factors
Eligibility factors are the criteria used to determine for whom the death
penalty may be imposed under law.' Through eligibility factors, a state narrows
all crimes of murder into a subclass of capital crimes.9 Eligibility factors must
therefore achieve the constitutional objective of channeling the sentencer's
discretion so as to eliminate the standardless or arbitrary application of the death
penalty.' ° In this respect, eligibility factors cannot be "too vague."'" An
impermissibly vague eligibility factor "fails adequately to inform juries what they
must find to impose the death penalty and, as a result, leaves them and appellate
courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman
v. Georgia."'
12
In Lowenfield v. Phelps,3 the United States Supreme Court made clear that
states may establish death eligibility through two methods.' 4 In the first method,
death eligibility is achieved at the culpability phase of a bifurcated trial upon a
finding of guilt of capital murder, as defined by the legislature. 5 In the second
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 568,
604 (1978); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.46.
8 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994).
9 d. at 972; see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
"Id. (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990)).
12 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988) (discussing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)); see Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (stating that an eligibility factor is "too vague" if it
lacks a "common-sense core of meaning... that criminal juries should be capable of
understanding")).
13 484 U.S. 231 (1988).




method, death eligibility is achieved when the defendant is found guilty of a
broader class of murder and then, "at the penalty phase" of a bifurcated trial, the
capital sentencer finds an additional fact of an aggravating circumstance that
narrows the murder into a subclass of capital murder. 6
The Ohio General Assembly, however, has enacted a third method for
establishing death eligibility. In Ohio, the defendant becomes death-eligible at the
culpability phase of a bifurcated proceeding in a two-step process. The defendant
must first be found guilty of committing at least one of five types of aggravated
murder. 7 The defendant must then be found guilty of at least one of nine
aggravating circumstances.18 A case may proceed to the penalty phase to
6 id.
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (West 1997) (purposely and with prior calculation
and design cause death); id. § 2903.01(B) (purposely cause death or unlawful termination of
pregnancy while committing/attempting to commit or fleeing immediately after
committing/attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, or escape); id. § 2903.01(C) (purposely cause
death of victim under age thirteen at time of offense); id. § 2903.01(D) (purposely cause death
while under detention or breaks detention); id. § 2903.01(E) (purposely cause death of law
enforcement officer, offender knows or has reasonable cause to know victim -is law
enforcement officer, and victim engaged in duties at time of offense, or offender has specific
purpose to kill law enforcement officer); see id. § 2929.02 (penalties for murder).
18 An aggravating circumstance must be included in the indictment as part of the count
alleging aggravated murder or as a specification attached to the count alleging aggravated
murder. Id. § 2929.022. The Ohio Revised Code provides the aggravating circumstances in
section 2929.04(A). See, e.g., id. § 2929.04(A)(1) (assassination of president, person in line of
succession to presidency, Ohio governor or lieutenant governor, president-elect or vice
president-elect, Ohio govemor-elect or lieutenant govemor-elect, or candidate for any of those
offices); id. § 2929.04(A)(2) (murder for hire); id. § 2929.04(A)(3) (murder to escape
"detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense"); id. § 2929.04(A)(4)
(offense committed while offender under detention as in section 2921.01; excludes detention in
mental health facility unless offender was in mental health facility as result of charge,
conviction, or guilty plea to violation of the Ohio Revised Code); id. § 2929.04(A)(5)
(purposeful murder or attempt to kill with purpose before offense at bar, or offense at bar
involves purposeful killing or purposeful attempt to kill more than one victim); id.
§ 2929.04(A)(6) (victim was law enforcement officer, as defined in section 2911.01, offender
had reasonable cause to know victim was law enforcement officer and victim was engaged in
duties or offender had specific purpose to kill law enforcement officer); id. § 2929.04(A)(7)
(offender was either principal offender or acted with prior calculation and design in causing
death while committing/attempting to commit or fleeing immediately after
committing/attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or
aggravated burglary); id. § 2929.04(AX8) (victim was witness, purposely killed to prevent
testimony and victim not killed during commission/attempt of offense that victim witnessed, or
victim killed in retaliation for previous testimony); id. § 2929.04(A)(9) (victim under age
thirteen at time of offense and offender is either principal offender or caused death with prior
calculation and design).
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determine if the defendant gets a life sentence or death only if the defendant has
been found guilty of both aggravated murder and at least one aggravating
circumstance at the culpability phase. 9
The defense practitioner must keep Ohio's method for determining death
eligibility in mind when litigating non-penalty phase issues to ensure that his or
her client receives a heightened degree ofjudicial scrutiny on review. Judges must
afford a heightened degree of reliability to capital cases as the result of the
extreme finality of the death penalty.2° This requirement of heightened scrutiny
on review even extends to collateral proceedings on federal habeas corpus
petitions. 2 Thus, the capital defense practitioner must realize that many
culpability phase issues, such as instructional errors on the elements of an
aggravated murder charge or an aggravating circumstance, may create defects in
the constitutionally mandated process of narrowing the defendant into the class of
death-eligible defendants. The practitioner must therefore be prepared to argue
that culpability phase issues may demand the Supreme Court's "death is
different" scrutiny.
22
1. Juveniles Are Ineligible for the Death Penalty
With regard to juvenile offenders who commit murder, the Ohio Revised
Code provides more substantive protection than does the Federal Constitution. In
Stanford v. Kentucky,23 the United States Supreme Court decided that the Eighth
Amendment's "evolving standards of decency" are not infringed by the execution
of juvenile offenders as young as age sixteen.24 In light of Stanford, the minimum
age of eighteen for death eligibility is a significant substantive protection provided
by the Ohio Revised Code. Indeed, only fifteen of thirty-eight capital punishment
states set eighteen as the minimum age for death eligibility.
25
19 See id. §§ 2929.02, 2929.022, 2929.04(A).20 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion).
" See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987). But see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2)
(1994).
22 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 646 (1980) (requiring instruction on lesser-
included offense in capital cases).
" 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
24 Id. at 369-77, 380 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(l)(a) (2000);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (West Supp. 2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)
(West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(g) (1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(2) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01 (Michie Supp.
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(g) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Michie
2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1998) (reading in conjunction with
section 125.27, which states that crimes subject to section 60.06 sentencing can only be
2002]
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Although the Ohio Revised Code sets the minimum age for death eligibility
at eighteen, the defense retains the burden of proving this restriction.26 The
defense has the burden of raising the issue of juvenile status, and also the burden
of production to put forth evidence that the defendant was not yet age eighteen at
the time of the offense.27 Assuming the issue of age is then still in dispute, the
prosecution carries the burden of persuasion at trial to establish by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was at least age eighteen at the time of the
offense.
28
If the defendant did not raise the matter of age at trial and he or she is
erroneously sentenced to death, then the defendant may seek to vacate the death
penalty at any time after sentencing by filing a motion in the trial court.29 The
defendant must establish by a mere preponderance of the evidence that he or she
was not age eighteen at the time of the offense.3" When a defendant files a post-
sentencing motion to contest death eligibility on the matter of age, the trial court
must hold a hearing on the defendant's motion as to whether it is supported by
information to establish "probable cause" that the defendant was a juvenile when
he or she committed the offense.3'
The Ohio Revised Code provides this avenue for vacating a death sentence
on the matter of age under the "Appellate review of death sentence" section.32 If
direct appeal counsel discovers this issue, however, he or she must litigate in the
trial court, and not the appellate court.33 Direct appeal counsel who are able to
litigate this issue should also file a motion in the appellate court requesting to
have the direct appeal held in abeyance for the trial court to review the
defendant's motion to vacate the death sentence. Moreover, the doctrines of
committed by offenders over the age of eighteen); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (West
1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620 (Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(1) (1996); State
v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102-03 (Wash. 1993); see 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994).
26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (West 1997).27 Id. § 2929.02.
21 Id.; see id. § 2929.03(E) (providing penalties for defendants who were juveniles at the
time of the offense).29 Id. § 2929.05(C).
30 id.
3" Id.; cf State v. Scott, 748 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ohio 2001) (describing the "probable cause"
standard in the context of a hearing on competence to be executed).
12 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(C) (West 1997).
13 See id. Counsel handling a defendant's direct appeal could, of course, litigate an
ancillary claim alleging the ineffective assistance of trial counsel who failed to raise the matter
of age, assuming that the appellate record was adequate to support such a claim. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 701 (1984); State v. Ishmail, 423 N.E.2d 1068, 1070 (Ohio
1981).
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waiver and res judicata should be of no consequence if the defendant attempts to
bring this claim after the time for litigating either the direct appeal or the state
post-conviction has passed.34 This is so because the Ohio Revised Code provides
for a special statutory avenue to vacate a death sentence imposed improperly on
an offender who was under age eighteen at the time of the offense. Such an
avenue may be pursued "[a]t any time after a sentence of death is imposed....,3'
2. Mens Rea Elements of Purpose to Kill and
Prior Calculation and Design
The Supreme Court has made clear that states have wide latitude to define
criminal conduct, as the primary responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws lies
with the states. 36 With one exception in which the Court prohibited the death
penalty for the crime of felony murder simpliciter,37 the Court has deferred to
state legislatures with regard to the culpable mental state that is necessary to
render a criminally accused person death-eligible. In Tison v. Arizona,38 for
example, the Court found no violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause for the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who did not kill or
intend to kill, but who nevertheless was a major participant in the crime and who
acted with a "reckless indifference to human life." 39
In light of Tison, the Ohio Revised Code provides more substantive
protection to a person accused of a capital crime regarding the culpable mental
state for death eligibility than is required by the Federal Constitution. Four types
of aggravated murder require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the capital defendant purposely caused the victim's death.40 A culpable
mental state of purpose to kill is also included as an element of five of the nine
14 The defendant may not, however, relitigate the matter of age by motion under
section 2929.05(C) of the Ohio Revised Code when a challenge to age was unsuccessfully
made at trial.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(C) (West 1997).
36 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977).
37 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147-50 (1987) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 786-98 (1982)). In Enmund, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against disproportionate and excessive punishments was infringed by the death sentence of a
defendant who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. 458 U.S. at 797-801 (citations
omitted).
38 481 U.S. 137 (1987).39 Id. at 158.
40 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (B), (C), (D), (E) (West 1997); see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 378 (1970).
2002]
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aggravating circumstances.41 One type of aggravated murder requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the capital defendant
purposely and with prior calculation and design caused the victim's death.42 Prior
calculation and design is also an element of two of the nine aggravating
circumstances.4 3 Regarding these two aggravating circumstances, the element of
prior calculation and design is applicable only if the defendant is not the principal
offender or actual killer in the aggravated murder.44 Culpability for aggravated
murder may be established by the prosecution under a theory of complicity;
45
however, complicity to capital murder must be established by proof of the prior
calculation and design element with regard to either the felony murder or the so-
called "child killer" aggravating circumstances.46
With regard to the prosecution's proof, the defense practitioner must pay
close attention to the culpability phase instructions on the mens rea elements of
the alleged offenses and aggravating circumstances to protect the valued rights of
the capital defendant on the question of death-eligibility. Especially crucial to this
objective is how the trial court defines "purpose to kill" for the jury. The Ohio
Revised Code defines "purpose" as follows:
A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result, or,
when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature,
regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific
intention to engage in conduct of that nature.47
By the use of the conjunction "or," the Ohio Revised Code separates this
41 Id. § 2929.04(A)(3) (offense committed for purpose of escape); id. § 2929.04(A)(5)
(offender convicted of prior purposeful murder/attempt); id. § 2929.04(A)(6) (specific purpose
to kill law enforcement officer); id. § 2929.04(A)(8) (victim killed for purpose of preventing
victim from testifying, or victim killed for purpose of retaliation for victim's testimony given);
id. § 2929.04(A)(9) (purposely cause death of victim under age thirteen).
42 Id. § 2903.01(A).
41 Id. § 2929.04(A)(7) (felony murder); id. § 2929.04(A)(9) (victim under age thirteen at
time of offense).
44 State v. Penix, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ohio 1987) (holding principal offender and prior
calculation and design are mutually exclusive statutory altematives and defendant cannot be
charged, convicted, and sentenced for both). But see State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 17 (Ohio
1998) (holding no reversible error to charge defendant as either principal offender or with prior
calculation and design, so long as defendant is convicted and sentenced on only one of the
statutory altematives).
4' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (West 1997).46 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7), (9) (West 1997); State v. Taylor, 612
N.E.2d 316, 325 (Ohio 1993) (stating that the principal offender element applies only to a
defendant who actually kills victim).
47 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(A) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
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definition of purpose into alternatives for "result" situations and "conduct"
situations. Only the first definition of purpose applies to an aggravated murder
case, which is a "result" situation.48 The Supreme Court of Ohio has expressed its
view that use of the "conduct" definition of purpose is improper in capital cases.49
Indeed, the conduct definition of purpose relieves the prosecution of its burden of
proof to establish a defendant's purpose to kill. It renders a defendant guilty
"regardless" of what the defendant intends to do, so long as he or she intentionally
engages in some type of prohibited conduct.5° Thus, a defendant who causes the
victim's death during a burglary, but does so without a specific purpose to kill,
could be found guilty of aggravated murder under the "conduct" definition of
purpose once the jury found that the defendant intended to commit the burglary.
Along these lines, the defense practitioner must ensure that the prosecution's
burden of proof on the mens rea element has not been lightened in any way.
Instructions that create a conclusive inference of the mens rea element or
instructions that require the defendant to rebut a presumption of guilt as to the
mens rea element are constitutionally infirm.5' Of course, a jury may infer a
defendant's purpose to kill from the facts--such as the use of a deadly
weapon-so long as the jury is properly instructed that such an inference is only
permissive. 2 The defense practitioner must ensure not only that any inference of
mens rea is permissive, however, but also that such an inference is narrowly
tailored to the defendant's culpability for acting with a specific purpose to kill.
Thus, it is improper to instruct a jury to infer a purpose to kill from the use of a
deadly weapon calculated to cause either the victim's death or great bodily
harm.
53
The defense practitioner must also be alert to issues that may arise when his
or her client is charged with purposely causing the victim's death with prior
calculation and design. 4 Unlike the element of purpose, the element of prior
calculation and design is not defined by the statute. The Supreme Court of Ohio
48 See OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 409.01 cmt.
49 State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 305 (Ohio 1996) (citing State v. Carter, 651 N.E.2d
965, 973-74 (Ohio 1995)).
'o See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 515 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
" See Francis, 471 U.S. at 316; see also Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 306 (finding mens rea
element of kidnapping charge improperly shifted to defendant). But see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 582 (1986) (holding that burden shifting instructional errors are subject to harmless error
analysis by reviewing court).
See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 331-32 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding no error when a
Tennessee jury instructed that it "may" infer malice for capital murder).
5' State v. Stallings, 738 N.E.2d 159, 172-73 (Ohio 2000).
54 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (West 1997); see id. § 2929.04(A)(7), (9).
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has made it clear, however, that the element of prior calculation and design is not
satisfied by proof that the defendant committed a premeditated murder
"conceived and executed on the spur of the moment."" Although no particular
amount of time is required for the defendant to act with prior calculation and
design, the prosecution must establish that the defendant "planned or analyzed
with studied care a scheme 'designed to implement the calculated decision to
kill' . . . and the means of doing so. ' 56
The prosecution's burden of proof on the mens rea element may also be
eased by improper instructions on the element of causation that is found in all five
types of aggravated murder. In particular, an instruction that allows the jury to
find that the defendant purposely caused the victim's death if the death was
foreseeable may eviscerate the prosecution's burden of proof. Both the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Ohio have expressed
disapproval of such "foreseeability" standards in capital cases.
57
The defense practitioner must also ensure that his or her client is not made
death-eligible under a theory of complicity without proof of the requisite mental
state for a capital crime.58 The instructions on complicity must make it clear to the
jury that the defendant is not death-eligible unless he or she solicits or aids and
abets with a specific purpose to kill the victim and not just that the defendant is
guilty of purposely soliciting or aiding and abetting the principal offender
generally. Moreover, a defendant charged under a complicity theory is entitled to
have the jury instructed to view an alleged accomplice's testimony with "grave
suspicion." 59
Finally, the defense practitioner must ensure that the jury is instructed on all
essential elements of death eligibility factors. The trial court's failure to instruct
on an element is prejudicial when the defense contests the omitted element and
the prosecution's proof of the omitted element is not overwhelming.6 ° Under
5' State v. Keenan, 689 N.E.2d 929, 950 (Ohio 1998) (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, 88 (Ohio 1997)).56 1d. at 951 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State v.
Cotton, 381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978)).
57Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1987) ("[T]he Arizona Supreme Court
attempted to reformulate 'intent to kill' as a species of foreseeability .... The Arizona Supreme
Court's attempted reformulation of intent to kill amounts to little more than a restatement of the
felony-murder rule itself."); State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 883 (Ohio 1998) (citing State v.
Burchfield, 611 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ohio 1993) (stating that a foreseeability instruction is
improper in an aggravated murder case)).
IfOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (West 1997). A person found guilty of complicity of
aggravated murder may be punished as if he or she was the principal offender. Id. § 2923.03(F).
'9 Id. § 2923.03(D).60 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1999) (holding that the failure to instruct on
an essential element may be harmless error where proof of uninstructed element is not
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misperceptions-about the highly charged question of capital punishment 66 may
cause a juror to view, at least subconsciously, that a defendant facing capital
specifications is more likely to be guilty.
These potential concerns do not remove Ohio's method of narrowing
eligibility from the "good" category. Justice Marshall's concern of bias in favor of
the death penalty is offset because the prosecution has the burden of persuasion at
the penalty phase to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors. 67 Bias in favor of the prosecution
at the culpability phase is likewise reduced by the prosecution's burden of
persuasion, as well as by routine instructions informing the jury that it must
decide factual questions as to criminal charges and specifications separately and
without regard to the jury's verdict on any other charge or specification.
Further, in the many cases involving a felony murder aggravating
circumstance, there is a substantial overlap between the evidence that the
prosecution may offer to prove that aggravating circumstance and the evidence
that the prosecution may offer to prove a substantive felony-based charge, such as
aggravated robbery. Thus, jurors in many felony murder cases would be biased in
favor of finding an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase by virtue of
their previous culpability phase verdicts on felony-based charges. 8 Moreover,
jurors discover at voir dire that the defendant may become death-eligible.
Accordingly, it is defense counsel's responsibility at voir dire to identify and to
remove those prospective jurors-by a challenge for cause or a peremptory
challenge-who harbor beliefs that death-indicted defendants are more likely to
be guilty due to the severity of the state's allegations.
On balance, we believe that Ohio's procedure of litigating the issue of death
eligibility at the culpability phase is more favorable than not to a capital
defendant. Ohio's procedure places the focus on the defendant's mitigation at the
penalty phase. Indeed, the penalty phase is oftentimes referred to as the mitigation
phase by judges and capital litigators. If the prosecution had to prove death
eligibility at the penalty phase, however, then the emphasis on mitigation at this
66 Cf Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
the pressures on elected judges to "profess their fealty to the death penalty" and death penalty
issues generally are highly politicized).
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2), (3) (West 1997).
68 A felony aggravated murder charge and a felony aggravating circumstance do not,
however, have "a complete overlap" as was the case in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 258
(1998) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This is so because the felony aggravating circumstance
includes the additional element of either "principal offender" or "prior calculation and design."
Id. Moreover, only the "aggravated" versions of arson, robbery, and burglary are included in the
felony murder aggravating circumstance. Id. Compare OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7)
(West 1997), with id. § 2903.01(B).
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Ohio law, moreover, essential elements must be defined for the jury in addition to
being set out in the jury instructions.61
3. Proof ofAggravating Circumstances at the Culpability Phase
As previously described,62 the Ohio General Assembly has chosen to make
capital defendants death-eligible by proof of an aggravating circumstance at the
culpability phase.63 Although we describe this procedure as one of the "good"
aspects of Ohio's death penalty statute, there is certainly room for debate as to
whether this is so. This method of establishing death eligibility is not a clear
benefit to capital defendants, as is, for example, the statutory provision that makes
juveniles ineligible for the death penalty.
In Lowenfield v. Phelps,64 Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in his dissenting
opinion that Louisiana's method of establishing death eligibility at the culpability
phase created a bias in favor of the imposition of the death penalty that
diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its penalty phase verdict. 6 This
concern is certainly worth noting as to Ohio's similar procedure of establishing
death eligibility at the culpability phase. Additionally, it may be that the
prosecution gains some advantage in seeking a conviction on an aggravated
murder charge at the culpability phase by presenting additional arguments and
evidence on the aggravating circumstances. Public perceptions-or
contested). Neder was not a capital case and therefore it was not subject to the Eighth
Amendment's imperative of heightened reliability due to the qualitative difference of the death
penalty. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion); cf
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) ("That same
need for heightened reliability also mandates recognition of a capital defendant's right to
require instructions on the meaning of the legal terms used to describe [sentencing
procedures] .... ).
61 See State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (Ohio 1999) (stating that the trial court
should have defined "principal offender").62 See supra Part II.A.
63 In Lowenfield v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court held that states could establish
death penalty eligibility by narrowly defining capital crimes at the culpability phase or by
broadly defining capital crimes at the culpability phase and then narrowing eligibility by
requiring proof of an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase. 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1998).
Since Lowenfield, the Court has not addressed the merits of Ohio's third method of establishing
death eligibility. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, has rejected Eighth Amendment
challenges to Ohio's method of establishing death eligibility made on reliance of Lowenfield.
State v. Henderson, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 1242-43 (Ohio 1988).64 484 U.S. 231 (1998).
61 Id. at 257-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
341 (1985)).
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phase would diminish. Instead, the penalty phase would become a mini-trial on
the aggravating circumstance, with the attendant risk of improperly emphasizing
the homicide itself as an aggravating circumstance.69 In light of the current
procedure, the penalty phase creates a line of demarcation where the focus shifts
to the mitigating aspects of the offense and the offender's character and record.7 °
Defense counsel at trial should seek a continuance of as long as possible between
the culpability and penalty phases to further emphasize that line of demarcation.7'
4. Defendant May Try Prior Purposeful Murder Aggravating
Circumstance to the Judge in a Jury Trial
There is an exception to Ohio's procedure of determining death eligibility at
the culpability phase. The Ohio Revised Code allows the defendant to elect to try
an aggravating circumstance based on a conviction for a prior purposeful
murder-or prior purposeful attempted murder72-to the judge at the penalty
phase of a jury trial.73 If the judge determines that the defendant is guilty of the
prior murder aggravating circumstance, then the jury weighs the prior purposeful
murder aggravating circumstance against the defendant's mitigating factors at the
penalty phase, as in other cases.
74
Again, Ohio's procedure regarding the prior purposeful murder aggravating
circumstance affords more protection to capital defendants than the Federal
Constitution requires.75 This benefit of the Ohio Revised Code is significant
because "evidence of a prior murder conviction is extraordinarily and
69 State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 280 (Ohio 1984) (ruling homicide cannot be weighed
as an aggravating circumstance).70 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604-05 (1978).
71 If defense counsel is able to obtain a continuance, then it is crucial to have the jury
instructed not to discuss the case, not to conduct any independent fact-finding, and to avoid
media exposure about the case. Defense counsel should promptly request a hearing if he or she
has grounds to suspect that any juror has been exposed to extraneous contacts or information
regarding the case during the continuance between the two phases of a capital trial. Remmer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956). Of course, defense counsel should prepare for the
penalty phase long before even the trial phase begins. The penalty phase investigation should
never be delayed until a continuance between phases has been granted.
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5) (West 1997).
" Id. § 2929.022(A). The defendant may also elect to try the section 2929.04(A)(5)
aggravating circumstance to a three-judge panel at the penalty phase if the defendant waives his
or her right to a jury trial. Id.
74 Id.; see id. § 2929.03(D)(2).
71 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164-66 n.9 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Georgia's scheme that allows the jury to find an aggravating circumstance based on the "prior
record of conviction for a capital felony").
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overwhelmingly harmful to a capital defendant. '7 6 Such evidence is prejudicial
because it may create an inference of guilt based on mere criminal propensity or
bad character of the defendant.77 The prejudice resulting from a conviction of a
prior purposeful murder is deemed so significant by the Ohio General Assembly
that the accused may elect to try this aggravating circumstance to a panel of three
judges after the culpability phase if the accused waives his or her right to a jury
trial. This is significant because judges are usually presumed to ignore matters
that may be prejudicial or legally irrelevant.78
The defense practitioner should elect to try this aggravating circumstance
after the culpability phase to reduce the risk of prejudice to his or her client
regarding the other charges in the indictment.79 Of course, in some cases the
defense practitioner may, with the client's consent, try the prior purposeful
murder aggravating circumstance to the jury as a matter of strategy. If the
defendant is not contesting legal culpability and the defendant's only objective is
to get a life sentence from the jury, then the defendant may want the prospective
jurors at voir dire to be aware of a prior murder committed by the defendant. In
such circumstances, it would be crucial for the defense to identify and to
challenge the service of any prospective juror who would automatically impose
the death penalty upon a person who has murdered before.
Additionally, the defense practitioner must ensure that the prior conviction
involves a culpable mental state that meets the requirement of a prior purposeful
killing or prior purposeful attempt to kill. In State v. Johnson, ° the Supreme
Court of Ohio vacated a death sentence erroneously based on this aggravating
circumstance where the jurisdiction in which the prior conviction was obtained
did not recognize the prior killing as purposeful.8'
Based on Johnson v. Mississippi,2 the defense practitioner may also raise a
constitutional challenge to the prior purposeful murder aggravating circumstance
if the conviction underlying the prior murder has been reversed.83 As in Johnson
v. Mississippi, evidence introduced at a capital trial to support a prior conviction
76 State v. Erazo, 594 A.2d 232, 253 (N.J. 1991) (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); cf Ferrell v. State, 680 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. 1996) (noting that prior murder
aggravator is "weighty").77 Cf. OHIO R. EviD. 404(B).78 See State v. Post, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Ohio 1987).
79The defendant may not elect to try the mass murder element of the
section 2929.04(A)(5) aggravating circumstance after the culpability phase.
'0 643 N.E.2d 1098 (Ohio 1994).81 Id. at 1103-04.
82 486 U.S. 578 (1988).83 Id. at 585.
[Vol. 63:549
OHIO'S DEA TH PENAL TY STA TUTE
aggravating circumstance becomes "irrelevant"8 4 and "materially inaccurate
'8 5
once the prior conviction is itself reversed. Johnson v. Mississippi makes clear
that a death sentence based on "materially inaccurate" information violates the
Eighth Amendment's requirement of reliable and non-arbitrary capital
sentencing. 6
5. The Requirement of a Unanimous Verdict on Statutory
Alternatives Creating Death Eligibility
The Ohio Revised Code sets out several alternative means of establishing
death eligibility within particular definitions of aggravated murder.8 7 Alternatives
to death eligibility are also presented within several aggravating circumstances.
88
It is essential that the defense practitioner ensure that the triers of fact make
unanimous findings as to any alternative elements of eligibility factors, whether
those elements appear in the definition of aggravated murder or within the
aggravating circumstances.
In State v. Penix,89 the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated a death sentence in
which the statutory alternatives of principal offender and prior calculation and
design were both weighed as felony murder aggravating circumstances.90 The
court explained:
84 Id.
5 Id. at 590.
86 Id. In Johnson, the claim was first raised on post-conviction instead of direct appeal. The
state court found a procedural bar because the claim had not been raised on direct appeal. The
Court found that the state's procedural bar was not regularly followed and therefore inadequate
to preclude federal review. Id. at 580-83, 587.
87 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (West 1997) (purposefully and with prior
calculation and design cause death or unlawful termination of pregnancy); id. § 2903.01(B)
(cause death or unlawful termination of pregnancy while committing a felony, nine felonies
listed as predicate to aggravated felony murder); id. § 2903.01(D) (under detention because of
guilty verdict/plea or breaks detention); id. § 2903.01(EX1)-(2) (purposely cause death of law
enforcement officer when either victim engaged in duties or offender's specific purpose is to
kill law enforcement officer).
" Id. § 2929.04(A)(5) (prior purposeful murder/attempt or multiple murder); id.
§ 2929.04(A)(6) (law enforcement officer engaged in duties or specific purpose to kill law
enforcement officer); id. § 2929.04(A)(7) (felony murder offender either principal offender or
committed offense with prior calculation and design); id. § 2929.04(A)(8) (victim kills to
prevent testimony or in retaliation for testimony given); id. § 2929.04(A)(9) (victim under age
thirteen; offender either principal offender or committed offense with prior calculation and
design).
89 513 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio 1987).
90 Id. at 747.
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The language of the statute provides that these are alternatives which are not to
be charged and proven in the same cause. Thus, if the defendant is found to be
the principal offender, then the aggravating circumstance is established, and the
question of whether the offense was committed with prior calculation and design
is irrelevant with respect to the death sentence. 91
In later cases, the court modified the Penix rule by allowing the prosecution
to charge both "principal offender" and "prior calculation and design" in a felony
murder aggravating circumstance so long as these mutually exclusive elements
are "given to the jury disjunctively." 92 The court has also stated, however, that
error results when the triers of fact fail to make a unanimous finding on one of
those alternatives even if they are stated in the disjunctive. 93 Thus, state case law
interpreting eligibility factors provides authority for the defense practitioner to
assert his or her client's right to a unanimous verdict on statutory alternatives
found within the elements of aggravated murder or aggravating circumstances.
Federal constitutional law must also be considered to fully preserve the
defendant's right to a unanimous verdict on statutory alternatives.94 In Schad v.
95Arizona, the United States Supreme Court considered a claim as to whether a
unanimous verdict was required on a state's capital murder alternatives of
premeditation or felony murder.96 The Court rejected this claim by finding that
premeditation and felony murder were merely different means to commit the
same offense, and not separate offenses.97 This logic would seem to apply to the
alternatives of "principal offender" and "prior calculation and design," as they are
alternate means to commit two of Ohio's aggravating circumstances.98 Schad
might be distinguished, however, when the prosecution relies on separate felonies
to elevate a charge of simple murder to aggravated felony murder.99 If a trier of
fact must decide between aggravated arson or aggravated burglary to render a
91 Id. at 746.
92 State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 17 (Ohio 1998); see State v. Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d 1251,
1266 (Ohio 1999).
93Moore, 689 N.E.2d at 17; cf State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1187 (1999) (holding
that the failure to provide instructions for a unanimous verdict on felony murder alternatives is
not plain error; the defendant did not request a unanimous finding instruction, alternatives were
presented to the jury disjunctively, and the jury found the evidence supported only the
"principal offender" element).
94 See Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that appellate
counsel was ineffective for abandoning viable federal claims in state court proceedings).
95 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality opinion).
96Id. at 627.
97 Id. at 630.
98 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7), (A)(9) (West 1997).
9 Compare id. § 2903.01(B), with id. § 2903.02.
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defendant death-eligible, then that trier of fact is necessarily deciding a factual
question involving a separate offense. In that circumstance, the choice between
one of two predicate felonies involves more than just a choice between separate
means to commit aggravated murder.1 00
A better litigation approach than Schad, however, lies with the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.0 1 In Apprendi, the
Court held that any fact, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction.., that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum[,]
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 2 The
application of Apprendi to the culpability phase of capital cases is quite clear, as
the Court further stated that "[t]he person who is charged with actions that expose
him to the death penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all elements of
the charge."'
0 3
In Ohio, the elements of aggravating circumstances are additional facts that
the jury must find to elevate the statutory maximum penalty of aggravated murder
from a prison sentence to the death penalty.' °4 Thus, the rule in Apprendi requires
an Ohio jury to unanimously find all of the essential elements of an aggravating
circumstance at the culpability phase by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'0° With
the exception of the prior purposeful murder aggravating circumstance,'0 6 a
capital defendant's fundamental rights to a jury trial and to due process are
infringed when the jury fails to make a unanimous finding of fact on a statutory
element of an aggravating circumstance, such as "principal offender" or "prior
calculation and design."'0 7
'00 See Schad, 501 U.S. at 630.
101 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
'02 Id. at 490.
103 Id. at 497 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted)).
04 See Esparza v. Anderson, No. 3:96-CV-7434 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2000).
o5 See State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1178 (Ohio 2001) (holding that "another offense"
committed by offender is essential element of section 2929.04(A)(3) aggravating
circumstance); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5) (West 1997).
107 In light of Apprendi, Ohio's procedure of determining the existence of aggravating
circumstances at the culpability phase is indeed a benefit to the defendant. This is so because
capital jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court establishes that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial does not extend to penalty phase proceedings. See infra Part
II.C. Apprendi does not "render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after
a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors
before imposing a sentence of death." 530 U.S. at 496 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
647-49 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). But see id. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If the
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6. "Another Offense Committed by the Offender" is an Element of the
"Escape" Aggravating Circumstance That Must Be Proved
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
One path to death eligibility in Ohio arises if the aggravated murder was
"committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or
punishment for another offense committed by the offender."1°8 In State v.
Jones,'09 the victim, a police officer, was shot to death as he pursued the
defendant to arrest him on an outstanding warrant for a charge of aggravated
robbery."0 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the "another offense"
component of the "escape" aggravating circumstance is an essential element of
that aggravating circumstance."' The court held that the prosecution must
establish that the defendant in fact committed the other offense by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."2
As a practical matter, the other offense committed by the defendant will often
be a felony committed during a course of conduct murder."3 Thus, the aggravated
murder will be committed directly before or after the commission of the other
offense, and the prosecution's proof of the other offense element will not be
highly problematic.' 14 An unusual case such as Jones, however, presents
problems of proof for the prosecution of which the defense practitioner must be
aware. When the other offense occurs before, and unassociated with, the
aggravated murder, the prosecution must put forward sufficient evidence that the
Court does not intend to overrule Walton, one will be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it
issues today ..... "); Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 865 (2002) (granting certiorari to re-examine
the holding in Walton). Accordingly, a capital defendant in Ohio gains the benefit of the
Apprendi rule regarding the right to a jury trial because fact-finding for death eligibility
questions is made at the culpability phase when the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
attaches.
log OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(3) (West 1997).
109 744 N.E.2d 1178 (Ohio 2001).
"O ld. at 1169.
... Id. at 1178.
112id.
"3 See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 294-95 (Ohio 1984) (stating that duplicative
felony and escape aggravating circumstances should merge).
14 In such cases, however, the defense practitioner must ensure that the
section 2929.04(AX3) "escape" aggravating circumstance and any section 2929.04(A)(7)
"felony murder" aggravating circumstance merge into each other before the start of the penalty
phase. See Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d at 294-95 (requiring the merger of duplicative aggravating
felony and escape aggravating circumstances).
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defendant actually committed each element of the other offense. 1 5 This requires
the prosecution to put on a "mini-trial" for the other offense during the trial for
aggravated murder.
116
As a tactical matter, defense counsel may, with the defendant's consent,
choose to seek a stipulation from the prosecution that the other offense was in fact
committed by the defendant." 7 This tactic could be a reasonable one where, for
example, the evidence of guilt (including all aspects of death eligibility) is
overwhelming and the evidence that the prosecution could offer to prove the other
offense would tend to prejudice the defendant at the penalty phase." 8 Otherwise,
the defense practitioner should rely on Apprendi to require jury fact-finding on
this element of the "escape" aggravating circumstance." 9
B. Selection Factors and Sentencing Procedures
Selectioi factors are the criteria used by the capital sentencer to determine if
death is proper in a particular case." 0 The Federal Constitution affords states wide
latitude to structure the sentencer's consideration of selection factors.' 2 ' The
Supreme Court has stated that there is no 'specific method for balancing
mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding [that] is
constitutionally required'. . . .Equally settled is the corollary that the Constitution
does not require a State to ascribe any specific weight to particular factors, either
in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered by the sentencer."'' 22
115 See Jones, 744 N.E.2d at 1186-87 (Cook, J., concurring).
116 see id.
117 See State v. Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1258-59 (Ohio 1999) (citing Clozza v.
Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1099-00 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that tactical concession may be
reasonable attorney performance)).
" 8 The jury may consider culpability phase evidence introduced at the penalty phase "that
is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was
found guilty of committing." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997); see infra
Part II.B.1.
119 See supra Part II.A.5. The section 2929.04(A)(3) element of "another offense
committed by the offender" does not fall into Apprendi's exception of a fact of a prior
conviction. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Supreme Court of Ohio's
disposition of this issue in Jones makes it clear that the state's proof is not limited to journal
entries demonstrating proof of a prior conviction of the "other offense committed by the
offender." Jones, 744 N.E.2d at 1178 (holding that the testimony of the other offense by
defendant's cousin was sufficient to prove the element).
20 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
21 See id. at 974; Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362 (1993); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 890 (1983).
2 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164, 179 (1988)).
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The Eighth Amendment, however, mandates that the capital sentencer must
consider and give full mitigating effect to all relevant mitigating evidence of the
defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.123 The
:Federal Constitution also prohibits the consideration of impermissibly vague
aggravating circumstances in the sentencing process. 24 Moreover, the capital
defendant has a constitutional right to rebut any information on, which the
sentencer may rely to impose death.
121
With these constitutional principles in mind, we now discuss the selection
factors and sentencing procedures in Ohio's death penalty statute. Ohio is a
weighing state. The aggravating circumstances from the culpability phase serve as
selection factors at the penalty phase. They are weighed against the sum of the
defendant's mitigating factors. The death penalty is imposed if the aggravating
circumstances outweigh all of the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
As discussed in the next section, the clear delineation and weighing of selection
factors in aggravation and mitigation provides the Ohio capital defendant with
one of his or her most important statutory protections at the penalty phase.
1. Statutory Selection Factors Are Carefully
Circumscribed as Aggravation or Mitigation
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.' ' 126 Accordingly, the Eighth
Amendment requires that the capital sentencer must be able to consider "as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."' 27 The Court has made clear that "any barrier [to the sentencer's
123 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317-18 (1989); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.
1, 8 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586,604-05 (1978).
124 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973-75; Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (per
cuiam); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228
(1992).
125 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.l; id. at 9 (Powell, J., concurring); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion).
126 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted).27 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. The court in Lockett held that the sentencer must consider all
relevant mitigation "in all but the rarest kind of capital case." Id. Thus, the Court
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consideration of relevant mitigation] must.., fail."'' 28
The Court has also held, however, that this Eighth Amendment requirement
is satisfied when mitigating evidence is within the sentencer's "effective
reach.' 29 Moreover, states may "structure the consideration of mitigating
evidence"'"3  without violating the rule in Lockett v. Ohio.13 ' A state capital
sentencer may therefore regard a potential mitigating factor, such as the youth of
the defendant, as a fact that aggravates the crime in favor of the death penalty so
long as the capital sentencer is at least able to effectively consider the evidence
proffered by the defendant as a mitigating factor.'3 2 Simply put, the Federal
Constitution does not require a mitigating result from the presentation of a capital
defendant's mitigating evidence.
In this context, Ohio's death penalty statute provides one of the most
significant protections to capital defendants. The Ohio Revised Code structures
the presentation and consideration of selection factors so that the defendant's
suggested-albeit without deciding--that a mandatory death sentence might be permissible in
the case "when a prisoner-or escapee-under a life sentence is found guilty of murder." Id. at
604 n.l 1. In Sumner v. Shuman, however, the Court closed this loophole to the rule in Lockett.
483 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1987). See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (citing Sumner,
483 U.S. at 81-82).
128 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,442 (1990).
29 Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,475-76 (1993)).
130 Id. at 373.
131 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
132 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 976-77 (1994) (holding that California's
unitary list of weighing factors is not vague; the sentencer is allowed to consider "competing
arguments" as to the statutory factor of "age"); Johnson, 509 U.S. at 373 (holding that under the
Texas special issues, the defendant's youth could be mitigating or aggravating); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983) (concluding that Georgia's non-weighing scheme
permits the jury to consider a myriad of factors once the death eligibility threshold is crossed by
proof of an aggravating circumstance). A Lockett claim challenging an alleged preclusive jury
instruction on mitigation is reviewed by the court to determine if there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that the jury applied the instruction to prevent its consideration of mitigating
evidence. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). The Supreme Court does not limit its
review of a Lockett claim to the language of the jury instructions provided on selection factors.
It also takes into account the context of the entire sentencing proceedings in light of the jury
instructions, including testimony of the mitigation witnesses and the arguments of counsel. See
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998); Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368 (quoting Boyde,
494 U.S. at 381) (noting that the Court does not engage in "technical parsing" of jury
instructions; rather, the review should be conducted with "commonsense understanding of the
instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial"); id. at 368 (stating that even on
"cold record" jurors "cannot be unmoved" by a father's testimony on the mitigating factor of
his son's youth, and it "strains credulity to suppose [youth as mitigation was viewed as beyond
the jury's effective reach]").
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presentation of mitigating evidence can lead only to a mitigating result. The Ohio
General Assembly has carefully circumscribed selection factors into mutually
exclusive categories of aggravation and mitigation. 33 Designated factors, such as
the circumstances of the offense and the youthful age of the defendant, must be
considered only as mitigating factors.'3 4 In Ohio, a capital defendant's mitigating
evidence either has weight as mitigation or has no weight at all. 3 1 Under the Ohio
Revised Code, and unlike other schemes upheld by the United States Supreme
Court, 136 the sentencer may not consider any proffered mitigating evidence for an
aggravating purpose. 31
2. No Facially Vague Aggravating Factors in Selection
Some states include facially vague aggravating selection factors in the
sentencing calculus. 3 ' Facially vague aggravating circumstances permit the
capital sentencer to consider nebulous issues such as the heinousness, coldness,
vileness, cruelty, atrociousness, wantonness, depravity of the offense, or the
offender's state of mind. 9 Vague selection factors inject arbitrariness into the
capital sentencing calculus because they "leave[] [juries] and appellate courts with
the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman v.
Georgia .... ,,40 An ordinary person sitting as a juror in a capital case may find
that all murder is heinous, vile, or depraved.' 4 1 Nevertheless, a state may salvage
a facially vague selection factor by giving it a limiting construction that is
sufficient to provide a "commonsense core of meaning... that criminal juries
33 Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (West 1997), with id. § 2929.04(B).3 4 See State v. Wogenstahl, 662 N.E.2d 311, 321 (Ohio 1996) (stating that
"[a]ny... suggestion" by the prosecution that the nature and circumstances of the offense is
anything other than mitigating factor is "wholly improper").
. The capital sentencer must of course consider all mitigating evidence regardless of
what weight it deserves. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
116 See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 362-63 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
137 But see infra Part HI.B.1.
138 See, e.g., Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (per curiam); Maynard v.
Cartright, 486 U.S. 356, 358-59 (1988). Vague aggravating circumstances are also included in
some states' death penalty schemes as eligibility factors. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420,433 (1980).
:39 See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 537 (1992); Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
140 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62; see id. at 364 ("To say that something is 'especially
heinous' merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that the murder is more
than just 'heinous,' whatever that means.... (emphasis added)).
141 See id. at 364 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 63:549
OHIO'S DEATH PENALTYSTA TUTE
should be capable of understanding." 14
2
The Ohio Revised Code does not include any facially vague aggravating
circumstances.1 43 This omission helps to reduce the risk that the sentencer may
consider arbitrary factors in determining the issue of punishment. Further, a state
appellate court's experiment to supply a sufficient limiting construction to a
facially vague aggravator may prove unsatisfactory. Eventually, the exception of
the limiting construction swallows the rule prohibiting vagueness, as more types
of crimes are found to meet, the language of the limiting construction or as the
limiting construction itself broadens by the addition of new definitions.1"
3. No Consideration of Defendant's Propensity for
Future Dangerousness as a Selection Factor
Ohio's death penalty statute does not permit the sentencer to consider in
aggravation the issue of whether the defendant would pose a risk of danger to
society in the future if given a life sentence.1 45 This omission is a clear benefit to
the defendant in light of United States Supreme Court precedent that permits a
state to include the issue of future dangerousness within the capital sentencing
calculus. 146 Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion in Simmons v. South
Carolina,147 however, muddied the waters on the issue of future dangerousness.
In Simmons, Justice Blackmun observed that consideration of future
dangerousness is permissible at the penalty phase even when it is not expressly
authorized by statute. 48 Justice Blackmun observed that "[a]lthough South
Carolina statutes do not mandate consideration of the defendant's future
dangerousness in capital sentencing, the State's evidence in aggravation is not
limited to evidence relating to statutory aggravating circumstances .... Thus,
prosecutors.., frequently emphasize a defendant's future dangerousness in their
"'149
evidence and argument at the sentencing phase ....
Despite Justice Blackmun's pronouncements, the prosecution in Ohio may
not properly raise the issue of future dangerousness at the penalty phase. First,
Justice Blackmun's remarks were dictum, expressed within a non-controlling,
142 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,973 (1994) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
279 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
141 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (West 1997); id. § 2929.022.
'44 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 694-99 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (West 1997).
146 See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275 (plurality opinion).
147 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
141 Id. at 162-63 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (stating that future dangerousness is
one of "many factors... that ajury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment").
149 Id.
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plurality opinion. 50 Second, and most important to the Ohio defense practitioner,
the prosecution's penalty phase evidence is limited to only the evidence
supporting the aggravating circumstance that was admitted at the culpability
phase and to rebuttal evidence of false or incomplete mitigation.' Thus, the
prosecution may rely on evidence of future dangerousness only as rebuttal to false
or incomplete evidence offered by the defendant that he or she would pose no
threat of danger in the future. In other words, the prosecution may rebut false
mitigating evidence as to the defendant's ability to adjust peacefully to
incarceration, offered under Skipper v. South Carolina,5 ' when the Skipper
mitigating evidence is used to suggest a lack of future dangerousness.
The defense practitioner must also be mindful of the type of rebuttal evidence
offered by the prosecution as to any mitigating evidence offered to show a lack of
future dangerousness under Skipper. The prosecution may not present any rebuttal
evidence to Skipper mitigation that is wholly unrelated to the particular
defendant's character or record. This is so because any assessment of future
dangerousness must be tailored to the "individual defendant."'5 Therefore, any
attempt by the prosecution to assert a generalized threat of future dangerousness
posed by prison inmates as the result of prison riots or escapes that do not involve
the individual defendant is improper.
Finally, the Ohio defense practitioner must be aware that the prosecution
cannot force the defendant to submit to psychological evaluations on the issue of
future dangerousness. Unlike the capital sentencing scheme in Texas,
psychological evaluations on the issue of future dangerousness are not permitted
because the future dangerousness issue itself is not included as a selection factor
in Ohio.' 54 Moreover, pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, only the defendant
5o See Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1270-71 (2001); O'Dell v. Netherland,
521 U.S. 151, 158-59 (1997) (noting that Simmons was controlled by Justice O'Connor's
concurrence).
151 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997); State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542,
551-52 (Ohio 1988). Evidence of future dangerousness cannot be injected into the penalty
phase by the readmission of culpability phase evidence that is relevant to the aggravating
circumstance. As Justice Blackmun explained, evidence of future dangerousness is irrelevant to
legal culpability. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163 (plurality opinion).
152 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
153 See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03 (1983) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976)).54 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (discussing a violation of the capital
defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; psychological evaluation for future
dangerousness took place without warnings of the right against self-incrimination and the
defendant had no opportunity to consult with counsel regarding the evaluation).
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may order a psychological examination during the penalty phase.' 55
4. Sentencer Does Not Consider Information About
Post-Sentencing Contingencies
Similar to the preceding discussion on future dangerousness, Ohio, unlike
other states, does not allow for the capital sentencer to take into account
information about post-sentencing contingencies, such as the availability of
pardons, commutations, or parole.' 56 Parole availability is considered by the
capital sentencer only with regard to two of the three life sentences authorized by
the current version of the statute." 7 We believe that information in capital
sentencing as to post-sentencing contingencies is prejudicial to the accused, as it
necessarily involves undue speculation and considerations of "the defendant's
probable future dangerousness."' 58
5. Prosecution Has the Burden of Persuasion Beyond
Reasonable Doubt in the Weighing of Selection Factors
The Ohio Revised Code provides the capital defendant with an important
protection in assigning the burden of persuasion to the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance outweighs all
mitigating factors.'5 9 This standard of proof regarding the sentencer's weighing
process is a benefit that is not required by the Federal Constitution.
60
The defense practitioner must be aware of three types of instructional errors
that undermine this right. First, the jury cannot weigh aggravating circumstances
for separate counts of aggravated murder charges collectively against the
defendant's mitigation. Instead, the aggravating circumstances as to each count of
an aggravated murder conviction must outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a
155 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997).
156 See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 995-97.
157 See infra Part II.D.
158 See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1003.
159 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2), (3) (West 1997).
160See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1376 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
petitioner's claim that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in balancing selection
factors is constitutionally required; the Supreme Court does not require a "specific method for
balancing... [selection] factors") (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988));
Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11 th Cir. 1983) (rejecting petitioner's claim that the
Winship standard of proof applies to the penalty phase in capital sentencing; selection factors
are "not elements of the crime itself') (citation omitted).
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reasonable doubt.161 The sentencer, for example, would have to weigh the
selection factors under the proper standard of proof three separate times if there
were aggravating circumstances for three separate counts of aggravated
murder.
162
The second instructional error on the burden of proof occurs when the jury is
permitted to weigh an aggravating circumstance against mitigating factors one by
one. The sentencer must find that an aggravating circumstance outweighs the
collective weight of the mitigating factors. 63 Thus, a mitigating factor cannot be
parsed out from other mitigating factors with regard to the statutorily mandated
weighing process.'64
The third instructional error results when the trial court repeats the culpability
phase instructions on the prosecution's burden of persuasion at the penalty phase.
At the culpability phase, the jury must find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
the "truth of the charge" of aggravated murder. This language should not be
repeated at the penalty phase because it is misleading. At the penalty phase, the
jury must find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors before it can recommend the death
penalty. The "truth of the charge" language creates a presumption in favor of
death that undermines the prosecution's burden of persuasion at the penalty
phase. By the time the case reaches the penalty phase, the jury has already been
convinced of the "truth of the charge" of aggravated murder by virtue of its guilty
verdict at the culpability phase. The "truth of the charge" language is thus
irrelevant to the selection process and its use should be avoided when the jury is
instructed on the prosecution's burden of persuasion at the penalty phase.1
65
161 State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895, 916-17 (Ohio 1989).
162 A defendant may not be sentenced to death on more than one count of aggravated
murder with aggravating circumstances, as separate counts of aggravated murder must be
merged for sentencing. State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 17 (Ohio 1998); State v. Huertas, 553
N.E.2d 1058,1066 (Ohio 1990).
161 See State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645, 654 (Ohio 2000).
'64 The defense practitioner at trial should guard against error by proposing proper jury
instructions. However, either proposed jury instructions or contemporaneous objections are
sufficient to preserve an error for appeal. State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (Ohio 1996)
(citing State v. Wolons, 541 N.E.2d 443, syl. 1 (Ohio 1989)). But see State v. Brown, 528
N.E.2d 523, 533 (Ohio 1988) (stating that motion in limine does not preserve issues for appeal).
165 See State v. Jones, 739 N.E.2d 300, 316 (Ohio 2000) (citing State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d
82, 96 (Ohio 1997)).
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6. The Capital Defendant Has Significant Latitude in the
Presentation of Mitigating Factors
The Ohio Revised Code sets forth mitigating factors to include the "nature
and circumstances of the offense," and the defendant's "history, character and
background."' 66 Also included are seven additional statutory factors: the victim's
inducement or facilitation of the offense; 67 whether the defendant was provoked
or coerced to commit the offense and whether the offender committed the offense
under duress; 161 whether the offender had a mental disease or defect at the time of
the offense that caused the offender to lack the "substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct to
the requirements of the law;' 169 the youthful age of the offender;170 the offender's
lack of prior criminal convictions or juvenile adjudications;17' the offender's
relatively minor role in the crime when the offender is not the principal
offender; 7' and the catch-all of any other factors "relevant to the issue of whether
the offender should be sentenced to death.
1 73
The plain text of the catch-all factor defines relevant mitigation more broadly
than does the capital jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. In Lockett
v. Ohio,174 the Court held that the capital sentencer must consider all "relevant"
mitigation proffered by the defendant.1 75 The Court has indicated that the
constitutional definition of "relevant" for the purposes of mitigation is limited by
the three mitigating factors specified in Lockett: the defendant's character, the
defendant's record, and the circumstances of the offense. 76 Of course, the three
Lockett factors have a broad reach so as to include mitigating factors, such as the
defendant's lack of intent to kill, 177 the defendant's relatively minor degree of
participation in the murder,77 and predictions about the defendant's ability to
adjust to incarceration that are based on the defendant's character or record.179
'66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1997).
.
67 Id. § 2929.04(B)(1).
168 Id. § 2929.04(B)(2).
169 Id. § 2929.04(B)(3).
170 Id. § 2929.04(B)(4).
171Id. § 2929.04(B)(5).
172 Id. § 2929.04(B)(6).
171 Id. § 2929.04(B)(7).
174 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
' Id. at 604.
176 See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n. 12.
177 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
178 Id.
179 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1986).
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Nevertheless, the plain text of Ohio's catch-all mitigating factor expands the
definition of relevance by permitting the sentencer to consider any other
mitigating factors in addition to the "nature and circumstances of the offense" and
the defendant's "history, character, and background."' 80 The Ohio Revised Code
also directs the trial court to afford the defendant "great latitude" in the
presentation of statutory mitigating factors and "any other factors in mitigation of
the imposition of the sentence of death."'' Accordingly, the application of the
Ohio Rules of Evidence is relaxed at the penalty phase with regard to the
presentation of mitigating factors. 8 '
7. The Defendant May Make an Unsworn Statement to the
Sentencer at Penalty Phase
The Ohio Revised Code allows the defendant to address the sentencer in an
unswom statement. 183 It directs the sentencer to consider any statement made by
the defendant and further provides that the defendant "is subject to cross-
examination only if [he or she] consents to make the statement under oath or
affirmation."' 84 Implicit in this provision is the policy decision of the Ohio
General Assembly to afford the defendant "great latitude" in the presentation of
mitigating factors by removing the threat of cross-examination with its chilling
effect. By providing the right to make an unswom statement, the General
Assembly has facilitated the presentation of important mitigating factors, such as
an expression of remorse by the defendant.'85
One related issue bears discussion at this point. In addition to his or her right
to make an unswom statement at the penalty phase, the capital defendant has a
right to allocution at the time of sentencing. 186 By the rules of criminal procedure,
the trial court has a duty to address the defendant to determine if he or she wishes
to make a statement to the court before it imposes the sentence.'8 7 The failure to
comply with this rule may be reversible error, unless the error is invited by the
180 See State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1124 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(7) (West 1997), with id. § 2929.04(B). But see
infra Part IV.B.2.
1 OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West 1997).
181 State v. Landrum, 559 N.E.2d 710, 721 (Ohio 1990).
183 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997).
184 Id.
18' See id. § 2929,04(C).
186 State v. Green, 738 N.E.2d 1208, 1208 (Ohio 2000); State v. Campbell, 738 N.E.2d
1178, 1178 (Ohio 2000).
187 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 32(A)(1); Green, 738 N.E.2d at 1208; Campbell, 738 N.E.2d at 1178.
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defendant.'88
8. Limitations on Preparation and Use of
Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports
Under the Ohio Revised Code, only the defendant may order the preparation
of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) for capital sentencing. '" The defense
practitioner must be aware that it is error for the trial court to sua sponte order a
PSI for capital sentencing.' 90 In addition to the error that results from the mere
preparation of a PSI without the defendant's consent, constitutional error may
also result when the defendant is interviewed in preparation of an unwanted PSI
without the defendant having received warnings as to his or her right against self-
incrimination.' 9' Likewise, the preparation of an unwanted PSI may violate the
defendant's right to counsel if the defendant is interviewed in preparation of an
unwanted PSI without having received the opportunity to consult with his or her
counsel.192 Finally, the defense practitioner should be aware of the statutory
provision that prohibits the prosecution from using any statement or information
provided by the defendant in preparation of a PSI as evidence of guilt in any
retrial of the defendant. 93
9. Funds Available to the Defense for Expert Assistance
The Ohio statute provides indigent capital defendants with funding for expert
assistance that is "reasonably necessary for the proper representation of a
defendant charged with aggravated murder at trial or at the sentencing
... Campbell, 738 N.E.2d at 1190.
189 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997).
190 State v. Campbell, 630 N.E.2d 339,346 (Ohio 1994).
19' Cf Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (finding a violation of the Fifth
Amendment when the defendant was not warned that participation in a psychological
examination on future dangerousness could later be used to incriminate him).
192See id. at 470-71 (discussing a Sixth Amendment violation by uncounseled
psychological examination on future dangerousness).
193 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(DXI) (West 1997). This provision, however, does
not expressly prohibit the prosecution from using any such statement or information provided
by the defendant as impeaching evidence in a retrial. Cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226
(1971) (holding that an improperly obtained statement may be used for impeachment, so long
as voluntarily made, even when the statement must be suppressed for use in prosecution's case-
in-chief). The prosecution is also prohibited from using information or a statement given by the
defendant during a mental examination conducted under section 2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio
Revised Code as evidence of guilt in a retrial of the defendant.
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hearing.' 94 The trial court must authorize both "fees and expenses" for any
necessary expert services, which are to be paid to the expert in the same manner
as appointed counsel is paid. 95 Defense counsel may obtain necessary expert
services without the trial court's prior approval if exigent circumstances require
defense counsel to seek authorization of funds after the use of the expert's
"necessary services."'196 When the trial court considers any request for expert
assistance made under this statutory provision, it is to consider within its "sound
discretion... (1) the value of the expert assistance to the defendant's proper
representation... and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill
the same function."' 97
The defense practitioner representing an indigent client should rely on section
2929.024 of the Ohio Revised Code, rather than section 2929.03(D)(1), when
requesting the assistance of a mental health expert for services rendered at the
penalty phase.9" Expert assistance provided under section 2929.024 "[is]
available to the indigent defendant solely for his own purpose in mounting a
defense."' 99 Unlike section 2929.024, all reports prepared by a mental health
expert at the request of the defense pursuant to section 2929.03(D)(1) are
submitted to the trial court, to the jury, and to the prosecution.
Finally, the defense practitioner also has a constitutional right to expert
assistance under both the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution and
article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.200 The Supreme Court of Ohio has
interpreted Ake v. Oklahoma20 ' to require-as a matter of due process-funding
for expert assistance when such expert assistance is "necessary to present an
adequate defense.
20 2
194 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.024 (West 1999).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 943-44 (Ohio 1998) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 473
N.E.2d 264, syl. 4 (Ohio 1984)).
Section 2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code, which permits defendants to obtain a
mental health expert, applies to all capital defendants regardless of whether they are indigent.
State v. Esparza, 529 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ohio 1988).
'
99 See Esparza, 529 N.E.2d at 195; see also Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1211 (6th Cir.
1995) ineffective assistance of counsel).
Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 944.
20' 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
202 Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 943. The Ohio court's interpretation of Ake is now "generally
recognized." Id. A minority ofjurisdictions, however, limit Ake to expert assistance on the issue
of sanity at the culpability phase of a trial. See, e.g., Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091,
1119 (6th Cir. 1990). A narrow interpretation of Ake seems illogical, as Ake extends the general
principle of due process that indigent criminal defendants must be afforded the "basic tools of
[Vol. 63:549
OHIO'S DEA TH PENAL TY STATUTE
C. The Defendant's Substantive Right to Jury Participation in Capital
Sentencing
The Ohio Revised Code provides for a jury's participation at the penalty
phase.203 This substantive state right to jury participation at the penalty phase
guarantees the defendant greater protection than is provided under the Federal
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury as inapplicable to capital sentencing
proceedings °.2 4 The Court has further held that a jury's participation in the capital
sentencing proceeding may be advisory.205 Moreover, the trial judge may
disregard an advisory jury's sentencing recommendation without affording it any
weight. 2
0 6
1. Important Features of Ohio Jury's Penalty Phase Role
The Ohio Revised Code provides for the jury to make a recommendation of
punishment to the trial court.20 7 The term "recommendation," however, is a
misnomer, as the trial court is bound to accept the jury's recommendation of a life
sentence.208 If the jury recommends the death penalty, then the trial court must
independently weigh the selection factors without deference to the jury's
an adequate defense." Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 326, 327
(1971)).
201 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(DX2) (West 1997). The defendant may waive
his riP.t to ajury trial in a capital case and proceed before a three-judge panel. Id. §2945.06.
See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (plurality opinion); Cabana v.
Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385-86 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984). But see
Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 865 (2002) (granting certiorari to re-examine the holding in
Walton).
20 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 466.
206 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995). This is not to say that a jury's
participation in a capital sentencing proceeding is beyond the reach of the Federal Constitution.
The Eighth Amendment, for example, prohibits the capital sentencer, whether judge or jury,
from weighing invalid aggravating circumstances. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081
(1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992). Further, the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a successive penalty phase after a defendant has been "acquitted" of the death penalty
by a jury at an original penalty phase that resembles a culpability trial. Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430, 444-45 (1981). Additionally, the service of a juror at the penalty phase of a
capital trial who cannot consider mitigating factors would infringe a defendant's right to due
process. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992).
207 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03(D)(2)-(3) (West 1997).
208 Id. § 2929.03(D)(3).
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recommendation of punishment. 09 Although trial courts rarely override a jury's
death penalty recommendation, this statutory feature is nevertheless a significant
benefit for the few defendants who have received judicial overrides of a jury's
death penalty recommendation. l°
The United States Supreme Court has held that jurors cannot be required to
reach unanimous agreement on the existence of a particular mitigating factor.2 '
The Ohio Revised Code provides an even greater benefit to capital defendants by
permitting a "solitary juror" to prevent the imposition of the death penalty "by
finding that the aggravating circumstances... do not outweigh the mitigating
factors., 212 An Ohio jury need not be unanimous to reject the imposition of the
death penalty, but it must be unanimous in order to recommend the death penalty
to the trial court:
If the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing
outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that
the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such afinding, the jury
shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to one of the following [life
sentences] .213
In light of the statute and United States Supreme Court precedent, the defense
practitioner must ensure that a capital jury has been guided in its penalty phase
instructions according to three important principles: first, jurors need not be
unanimous to determine the factual existence of any particular mitigating
factor;214 second, a "solitary juror" may prevent the imposition of the death
penalty by finding that the aggravating circumstance does not outweigh, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the sum of the mitigating factors; 215 and third, in order to
209 Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "the better procedure" is for judges and
prosecutors to avoid use of the statutory term "recommend" when addressing the jury because
the term may undermine the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict of death. See State v.
Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 813 (Ohio 1986) (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341
(1985)).
210 See, e.g., State v. Fuller, No. CR0O-03-0369 (Ohio C.P. Butler County Oct. 18, 2001).2' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,444 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,
374 (1988).
212 State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1042 (Ohio 1996); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1997).
213 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1997) (emphasis added); Brooks, 661
N.E.2d at 1042. After one or more jurors reject the death penalty, the jury is then to deliberate to
reach a unanimous verdict on one of the life sentences.
214 Mills, 486 U.S. at 374.
215 Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042.
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recommend the death penalty, the jury must unanimously fird, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the sum of the
mitigating factors.216 Thus, a properly instructed juror should fully understand that
he or she acting alone may prevent the imposition of the death penalty based on
the weight of a single mitigating factor.
The Federal Constitution does not require twelve-person juries in state
criminal trials to be unanimous in their verdicts. 217 Further, the United States
Supreme Court held in Jones v. United States2 8 that the Federal Constitution does
not mandate that capital juries be instructed as to the consequences of their
inability to agree on a sentencing verdict. 2 9 Nevertheless, we believe that the
defendant's substantial rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are
violated when an Ohio jury is instructed to be unanimous in order to reject the
imposition of the death penalty, as illustrated by the following analysis.
A capital jury cannot be "affirmatively misled regarding its role in the
sentencing process.' '22° The jury's role in the capital sentencing process is defined
by a state's capital sentencing scheme.22' In Ohio, the jury's fundamental role at
the penalty phase is defined by section 2929.03(D)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code.
The jury's role under this statute does not require it to be unanimous in rejecting
the death penalty. This is so because a "solitary juror" may prevent the imposition
of the death penalty by finding that the aggravating circumstances do not
outweigh the mitigating factors. 22 Accordingly, it would violate a defendant's
constitutional rights to affirmatively mislead the jury as to its fundamental role at
the sentencing phase by misinforming the jury to be unanimous in rejecting the
death penalty.223 Ohio has chosen these sentencing procedures to guide the
sentencing jury's discretion. It would thus render a defendant's death sentence
arbitrary and unreliable to eviscerate this critical guidance provided to capital
juries by the Ohio General Assembly. 224
216 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1997).217 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 362 (1972) (finding no requirement of a unanimous jury verdict with a twelve-person
jury); ef Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a
unanimous verdict on alternative pathways to committing a capital murder is not required). But
see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (stating that a unanimous verdict is required
for a six person jury in a trial of a non-petty offense).
218 527 U.S. 373 (1999).219 Id. at 381.
120 Id. at 381-82 (quoting Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1,9 (1994)).
21 Id. at 389 (noting that statutory analysis precedes Eighth Amendment analysis).
222 State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1042 (Ohio 1996).
223 Jones, 527 U.S. at 381-82 (citing Romano, 512 U.S. at 9).
224 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
(stating that essential sentencing terms must be made clear to the jury to comport with the
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Another issue of constitutional import arises when there is a purported jury
deadlock at the penalty phase on the issue of whether to impose the death penalty.
In Lowenfield v. Phelps,22 the United States Supreme Court found no violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when a deadlocked jury was given a
supplemental instruction or an Allen charge designed to break the impasse in the
penalty phase deliberation.226 The Court reasoned that "[t]he State has in a capital
sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury 'express the conscience
of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.', 227 The Court also
assumed that, "even in capital cases," the trial court "had the authority to insist
[on further deliberations]., 228
Unlike Lowenfield, Ohio has expressed a "strong interest" in permitting a
"solitary juror" to reject the death penalty through the enactment of
section 2929.03(D)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code.229 This policy choice of the
General Assembly is made clear by the omission of the word "unanimous" in
describing the role of the jury when the jury finds that the aggravating
circumstance does not outweigh the mitigating factors.23° Moreover, the Court's
reasoning in Lowenfield is distinguished from a coerced juror claim made under
the Ohio statute because it would be improper for a trial judge to order further
deliberations after a "solitary juror" has rejected the death penalty.231
The defense practitioner should object to any instruction by the trial court that
directs the jury to deliberate further on the choice between a life sentence or the
death penalty after one or more jurors indicate that they wish to impose a life
sentence. An Allen charge is proper at the penalty phase only if the jury is at an
impasse regarding the choice between one of the life sentencing options. 232 The
requirement of reliable capital sentencing); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 377 n.10 (1988)
(concluding that capital juries must be properly instructed in order to understand sentencing
issues); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding that heightened
reliability is required for capital cases).
225 484 U.S. 231 (1988).226 Id. at 237 (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)); see State v. Howard,
537 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio 1989).
... Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
(1968.81 Id. at 238-39.
"9 Compare id. at 238, with State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1042 (Ohio 1996).230 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1997); Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042.
'3 Compare Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237-38, with Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042.
... In State v. Springer, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a life sentence must be
imposed if the jury becomes deadlocked on the choice between life and death. 586 N.E.2d 96
(Ohio 1992). In light of Brooks, however, a single juror's choice to reject the death penalty at
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defense practitioner should request the imposition of one of the life sentencing
options as soon as the jury indicates that there is an impasse on the choice
between a life sentence and the death penalty.
2. Statutory Standard for Jury Selection in Capital Cases
In Wainright v. Witt,233 the United States Supreme Court established a
standard for whether a prospective juror may be found qualified to sit in a capital
case. 234 Under the Witt standard, a prospective juror may be removed for cause if
his or her views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his [or her] duties as a juror in accordance with his [or her]
instructions and.., oath.,
235
Ohio provides a statutory standard that, by its plain text, is more favorable to
the capital defendant than the Witt standard.236 Section 2945.25(C) of the Ohio
Revised Code provides that a prospective juror is unfit for service in a capital case
if "under no circumstances [would the prospective juror] consider fairly the
imposition of [the death penalty]. 237 This strict statutory standard excludes only
those prospective jurors who would never impose the death penalty. In contrast,
the Witt standard excludes prospective jurors who would agree to impose the
death penalty only in rare cases.
D. Punishments for Aggravated Murder with Aggravating Circumstances
In addition to the death penalty, a defendant may be sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for either twenty-five or thirty years or life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP).238 The availability of LWOP is a
significant improvement to the statute from the perspective of the defense
any time during penalty phase deliberations should result in the imposition of a life sentence.
Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042.
233 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
234 Id. at 424.
235 Id.; see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
236 But see infra Part IV.C.4.
237 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.25(C) (West 1997).238 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.022 (West 1997); id. § 2929.03(B)(C)(2)(a)(i). Before
July 1, 1996, the penalties for aggravated murder with an aggravating circumstance were the
death penalty and life in prison without the possibility of parole for either twenty or thirty years.
The availability of LWOP applies only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996. State v.
Raglin, 699 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ohio 1998).
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practitioner. 239 The availability of LWOP may alleviate the sentencer's concerns
about the defendant's propensity for future dangerousness if the defendant is
returned to society. 240 LWOP may also be viewed by the sentencer as an
appropriate expression of "society's moral outrage" over the crime,241 whereas a
lesser prison term may not be deemed sufficient. Nevertheless, the Ohio death
penalty statute is flexible so as to give the sentencer the option to impose a prison
term with the possibility of parole. Some states eschew this flexible response by
providing LWOP as "the only available alternative sentence to death .... ,242
Ohio's flexible sentencing options allow the sentencer to take into account the
individual defendant's potential for rehabilitation.
Data suggests that the availability of LWOP has had a significant effect on
reducing the imposition of death sentences in Ohio. In the 2000, only four death
sentences were imposed, whereas seventeen death sentences were imposed in
1995--the year before LWOP became effective. Indeed, between January 1, 1999
and June 15, 2001, only seventeen death sentences were imposed. This is in stark
contrast to the thirty-three death sentences imposed in 1994 and 1995. Although
the availability of LWOP is not dispositive of this marked decrease in the
imposition of death sentences, its significance is nevertheless readily apparent.
E. Mandatory Appellate Review of Death Sentences
The availability of meaningful appellate review is a key consideration by the
United States Supreme Court in determining whether a state's death penalty
scheme passes constitutional muster.243 The Court has not mandated, however,
that state appellate courts independently weigh selection factors as part of
appellate review of a death sentence. Indeed, the Court does not even require
reweighing by state appellate courts to correct constitutional weighing errors
made by the original sentencer. 244 In Pulley v. Harris,14s moreover, the Supreme
239 Three of the thirty-eight capital punishment states do not provide for LWOP as a
sentencing choice. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4635 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-14
(Michie 2001); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon 2000).
14°See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03 (1983) (stating that a Briggs
instruction informing the jury of the possibility of parole focuses the jury on the issue of the
defendant's future dangerousness if returned to society).
241 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
242 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 176-78 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243 Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
171-72 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06 (plurality opinion).
244 Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748 (1990) (stating that state appellate courts
may reweigh or use harmless error analysis to cure imposition of death penalty tainted by an
invalid aggravating factor).
241 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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Court held that state appellate courts are not constitutionally required to conduct a
comparative proportionality analysis of the death sentence imposed in a particular
case.246 In light of this precedent, it is clear that death penalty states have a fair
amount of discretion in providing for "meaningful appellate review."
247
Appellate review of a death sentence in Ohio is mandated by
section 2929.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.248 This review encompasses three
steps. First, the appellate court reviews the case for legal error as it would in a
non-capital case.249 Second, the appellate court determines if the death sentence
imposed is appropriate. 250 This appropriateness review requires the appellate
court to determine whether the original sentencing court properly weighed the
selection factors. The appellate court must also independently review the record
to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the aggravating
circumstance. Additionally, the appellate court must independently weigh the
selection factors and decide if it finds the death sentence to be appropriate based
on the record before it. Third, the appellate court must compare the case before it
to "similar cases" to determine if the death penalty imposed is either "excessive or
disproportionate" when compared to those other "similar cases.",2
51
The appellate court sits as a thirteenth juror when it independently weighs the
selection factors.252 The Ohio Revised Code requires that the appellate court itself
must be "persuaded" that the death penalty is appropriate based on all of the
record facts and evidence and the offense and offender.253 The Supreme Court of
Ohio has vacated death sentences in three cases pursuant to this statutory
appropriateness review.254 It has never vacated a death sentence pursuant to its
proportionality review.255
246 Id. at 50.247 See Parker, 498 U.S. at 321.
248 Both the Supreme Court of Ohio and the court of appeals review capital cases in which
the date of the offense preceded January 1, 1995. In other cases, the review is conducted by
only the Supreme Court of Ohio. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1997); see infra
Part III.D.
249 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1997).
250 Id.
251 Id. But see infra Part IV.D.1.
252 See State v. Apanovitch, 514 N.E.2d 394,405 (Ohio 1987) (Brown, J., dissenting).
253 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1997); Apanovitch, 514 N.E.2d at 405
(Brown, J., dissenting).
214 State v. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 472, 481-82 (Ohio 1991); State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97,
111 (Ohio 1991); State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 451, 460 (Ohio 1989).
255 See infra Part IV.D. I. The defense practitioner should not confuse the case by case
proportionality review rejected in Pulley v. Harris with a strand of Eighth Amendment analysis
arising from the excessive or disproportionate use of the death penalty. 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984).
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Ell. OHIO'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE: THE BAD
Although we believe that the Ohio death penalty statute is for the most part
favorable to a defendant, these statutes are not without flaws from the perspective
of the defense practitioner. In this section, we set forth what we believe to be the
unfavorable aspects of the text of the death penalty statute with regard to
eligibility factors, selection factors, the role of the jury in sentencing, and
appellate review. These unfavorable aspects of the death penalty statute result
from poor draftsmanship, omissions, and revisions by the Ohio General
Assembly.
A. Eligibility Factors
1. Mentally Retarded Defendants Are Death-Eligible in Ohio
The Federal Constitution does not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded
persons.256 By contrast, state legislators in eighteen of the thirty-eight death
penalty states prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.257 Unfortunately,
the Ohio General Assembly has not acted to include Ohio as a capital punishment
state that exempts mentally retarded persons from death-eligibility.
A death sentence violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause when it imposes the death
penalty on a class of offenders in a manner that is excessive or disproportionate to the values
underlying the Eighth Amendment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 888 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
116 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). The Supreme Court, however, has
granted certiorari in Atkins v. Virginia to revisit its decision in Penry as to whether a national
consensus exists to make mentally retarded persons death penalty ineligible. 510 S.E.2d 445
(Va. 1999), cert. granted sub. nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 70 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001)
(No. 00-8452), cert. grant amended 70 U.S.L.W. 3233. Accordingly, this unfortunate omission
to the Ohio death penalty statute may yet be corrected as a matter of constitutional law.
257 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3982 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1993);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-9-403 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(i) (1997); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.140 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27, § 412 (1996); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-
105.01 (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW
§ 400.27(12) (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 2.3A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2001); 2001 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 01-151 (West); 2001 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. ch. 2001-202 (West); 2001 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 267 (West); see 18 U.S.C. § 3596
(1994).
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The standards used by other states to exempt the mentally retarded from the
death penalty vary. Some require an onset of mental retardation by age eighteen,
while some use age twenty-two. 58 Some states set a threshold functional
intelligence quotient (IQ) at sixty-five to establish mental retardation while other
states set the threshold IQ at seventy.259 Still other states do not specify any
threshold IQ. 260
2. An Amendment to the Ohio Revised Code Removed Specific
Intent to Kill as an Element ofAggravated Murder
Culpability for aggravated murder used to include a requirement that the
offender had a specific intent to kill the victim at the time of the commission of
the offense.26' This specific intent to kill requirement was removed by legislative
amendment and is no longer applicable to aggravated murder committed on or
after July 1, 1998.262 Although this statutory amendment is unfavorable to the
capital defendant, we believe this change is not especially detrimental to the
defendant's interests.
Unlike Tison v. Arizona,263 Ohio does not permit a capital conviction upon a
mental state such as a reckless indifference to life.264 The defendant must have a
purpose to kill the victim to be guilty of any of the five types of aggravated
murder.2 65 The statutory definition of "purpose" requires the trier of fact to find
that the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause the certain result of the
victim's death.266 This equation fiom purpose to intent has been widely
incorporated into jury instructions in Ohio. Indeed, intent and purpose are
synonymous terms in the Ohio Jury Instructions.267
258 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1993), with IND. CODE § 35-36-9-1 to -7
(1998).
259 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1993), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.130-140 (Michie 1999).
160 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-9-401-403 (2000).261 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(D) (West 1997) (effective before August 6,
1997); id. § 2903.01(E) (effective before June 30, 1998).
262 See id. 2903.01(E).
26'481 U.S. 137 (1987).2 4 Id. at 157.265 See supra Part II.A.2.
266 see id.
267 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 503.01(2) (2000).
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3. Redundant Eligibility Factors
The Ohio Revised Code is unduly redundant with regard to death eligibility
factors. Since the current version of Ohio's death penalty statute was enacted in
1981, the types of aggravated murder have increased from two to five, and the
types of aggravating circumstances have increased by one.268 Although these
additions to the Revised Code have technically expanded the subclass of
murderers who are death-eligible, as a practical matter this expansion has
achieved the anomalous result of making Ohio's eligibility criteria more
redundant.
The original version of the 1981 death penalty statute contained a redundant
felony murder eligibility factor. The elements of aggravated felony murder under
section 2903.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code may operate to be essentially
redundant of the felony murder aggravating circumstance in
section 2929.04(A)(7). It is true that aggravated felony murder and the felony
murder aggravating circumstance are not literally repetitive. The aggravating
circumstance requires an additional finding of fact as to whether the defendant
was either the "principal offender" or killed with "prior calculation and
design., 269 Further, only the aggravated forms of arson, burglary, and robbery
appear as predicate felonies in the aggravating circumstance, unlike in the
substantive offense of aggravated felony murder, which includes plain arson,
burglary, and robbery as elements. Nevertheless, the substantive offense and the
aggravating circumstance provide no genuine narrowing in the case of a
defendant who acts alone and is charged with the aggravated form of the
predicate felony. Thus, a defendant acting alone who is found guilty of purposely
causing the victim's death while committing aggravated arson is necessarily
guilty of the "principal offender" and "aggravated arson" elements of the felony
murder aggravating circumstance. In such cases, the felony murder aggravating
circumstance is wholly redundant of the substantive felony murder charge.27°
268 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (C), (D), (E) (West 1997); id. § 2929.04(A)(9).
269 Principal offender and prior calculation and design are disjunctive elements and the
defendant may be guilty of only one. See State v. Penix, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ohio 1987).
170 In certain cases, the felony murder aggravating circumstance would genuinely narrow
for the purposes of death eligibility. For example, a defendant found guilty of felony murder
under a complicity theory of culpability would be guilty of purposely causing the victim's death
during the commission of a felony. To render such a defendant death-eligible, the prosecution
would have to prove a different and more stringent mental state-prior calculation and
design-as an element of the felony murder aggravating circumstance. Further, the felony
murder charge and aggravating circumstance would not be redundant in a case in which
different felonies were used as the predicate felonies for the aggravated murder charge and the
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Amendments to the original death penalty statute have created even more
redundancy. Under section 2903.01(C) of the Ohio Revised Code, a defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder when he or she purposely causes the death of a
victim "who is under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense. 271' The aggravating circumstance in section 2929.04(A)(9) merely
repeats the elements of the substantive offense.272 The offender must
"purposefully" cause the death of a child under age thirteen "at the time of the
commission of the offense" and the defendant must be either the "principal
offender" or kill with "prior calculation and design. 273 Similar to the felony
murder situation, there is complete redundancy in the case of a child killer who
acts alone, as the element of "prior calculation and design" does not apply to the
actual killer.274 When the defendant acts alone and is found guilty of committing
aggravated murder, then he or she is necessarily guilty of being the principal
offender.275 A finding of the "principal offender" element of the aggravating
circumstance does not genuinely narrow for the purpose of establishing death
eligibility.
Another redundant aspect of Ohio's death eligibility criteria arises from the
addition of the aggravated murder offense found in section 2903.01 (D) of the
Ohio Revised Code, which provides that "[n]o person who is under detention as a
result of having been found guilty of or having pleaded guilty to a felony or who
breaks that detention shall purposely cause the death of another. 276 This offense
is redundant when it is paired with the section 2929.04(A)(4) aggravating
circumstance, which, in pertinent part, provides that "[t]he offense was committed
while the offender was under detention or while the offender was at large after
having broken detention., 277 No genuine narrowing for death eligibility occurs
when this offense and this aggravating circumstance are paired.27
aggravating circumstance-for example, rape in the felony murder charge and aggravated arson
in the aggravating circumstance.
271 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.0 1(C) (West Supp. 2001).272 See id. § 2929.04(A)(9).
273 Id.
274 State v. Taylor, 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 (Ohio 1993). As with the felony murder situation,
the child killer aggravating circumstance is not redundant when the defendant is guilty of the
aggravated murder under a theory of complicity, as the aggravating circumstance requires the
additional finding of "prior calculation and design" in such cases.
171 See Taylor, 612 N.E.2d at 325 (stating that the principal offender is the actual killer).
176 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2903.01(D) (West 1997).277 Id. § 2929.04(A)(4).
278 There is also some redundancy between the substantive offenses defined in
subsections 2903.01(B) and (D) of the Ohio Revised Code, as one of the predicate felonies for
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Redundancy also results from the addition of aggravated murder under
section 2903.01(E) of the Ohio Revised Code. Under subdivision (E), a person is
guilty of aggravated murder when he or she purposely causes the death of a "law
enforcement officer whom the offender knows or has reasonable cause to know is
a law enforcement officer" and the victim is performing the duties of a law
enforcement officer, or the defendant had a "specific purpose to kill a law
enforcement officer."27 9 This offense simply repeats the elements of the section
2929.04(A)(6) aggravating circumstance.8 0
The addition of redundant eligibility factors undermines the constitutional
imperative that states must genuinely narrow the class of offenders for whom the
death penalty may be imposed.2 ' These amendments to the Ohio Revised Code
further emphasize the use of the death penalty as a political tool, as legislators
seek to capitalize on the public's anti-crime sentiment by broadening the
availability of capital punishment. By the addition of new, yet redundant
eligibility factors, the General Assembly drifts from the imperative of genuine
narrowing as it pays "fealty to the death penalty.2182
B. Selection Factors and Procedures
1. Consideration of "Nature and Circumstances ofAggravating
Circumstance" May Render Selection Guidance Vague
We believe that one of the most important statutory benefits to capital
felony murder under subdivision (B) is "escape," and purpose to kill is the mens rea element in
both subdivisions (B) and (D).
279 Id. § 2903.01(E).
280 Section 2929.04(A)(6) of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer, as defined in § 2911.01 of the
Revised Code, whom the offender had reasonable cause to know or knew to be a law
enforcement officer as so defined, and either the victim, at the time of the commission of
the offense was engaged in the victim's duties, or it was the offender's specific purpose to
kill a law enforcement officer as so defined.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(6) (West Supp. 2001).
211 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
212 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 519
n.5 ("As one commentator has written, '[m]ost experts on penal systems agree that capital
punishment does not deter capital crimes. But the public believes it does, and politicians have
been switching longstanding positions to accommodate that view...:. This... is the
democratic system."' (citing Garry Wills, Read Polls, Heed America, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 48)).
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defendants in Ohio is the clear delineation of selection factors as either
aggravating or mitigating.283 This benefit is undermined, however, by a statutory
provision that injects vagueness into the sentencer's weighing process. Section
2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code refers to "the nature and circumstances
of the aggravating circumstance." 284 That reference incorporates the nature and
circumstances of the offense into the factors that are weighed in favor of death.
The nature and circumstances of any offense, however, are statutory mitigating
factors under section 2929.04(B). Section 2929.03(D)(1) may render Ohio's death
penalty weighing scheme unconstitutionally vague because it gives the sentencer
unfettered discretion to weigh a statutory mitigating factor as an aggravating
circumstance.
The Ohio Revised Code definitively states that the nature and circumstances
of the offense are selection factors in mitigation. Moreover, because the nature
and circumstances of the offense are listed in section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio
Revised Code and not section 2929.04(A), they must be weighed only as
selection factors in mitigation.'" The clarity and specificity provided by
section 2929.04(B), however, are eviscerated by section 2929.03(D)(1). Section
2929.03(D)(1) states that "[t]he court... and the trial jury. .. shall hear testimony
and evidence that is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing ..... ,16 Through
section 2929.03(D)(1), selection factors that are strictly mitigating under section
2929.04(B) become part and parcel of the aggravating circumstance. It is
impossible for a "person of ordinary sensibility" to understand how a statutory
mitigating factor can support an aggravating circumstance.287
Despite the wide latitude that states have under the Eighth Amendment to
make their death penalty selection factors either aggravating or mitigating so long
as the factors are "evenhanded, rational, and consistent,"288 Ohio has carefully
circumscribed its selection factors into mutually exclusive categories of
aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors. Under Ohio law, therefore, the
"nature and circumstances" of any offense derive their "common-sense core of
meaning" from the context of this statutory dichotomy.289  Under
section 2929.04(B), the terms "nature and circumstances '290 lose their "common-
211 See supra Part ll.B.I.
284 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997).
211 See State v. Wogenstahl, 662 N.E.2d 311,321-22 (Ohio 1996).
286 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
287 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428 (1980).
288 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).
289 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279)
(White, J., concurring).
'90 See Wogenstahl, 662 N.E.2d at 321-22.
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sense core of meaning" as the result of section 2929.03(D)(1). 291
Section 2929.03(D)(1) makes section 2929.04(B) vague because it incorporates
the nature and circumstances of an offense into the aggravating circumstances.
The sentencer cannot reconcile the incorporation of a specific statutory mitigating
factor into the aggravating circumstances, as mitigating factors and aggravating
circumstances are mutually exclusive selection factors under Ohio law.
292
Section 2929.03(D)(1) is also unconstitutionally vague on its face because it
makes the selection factors in aggravation in subsections 2929.04(A)(1) to (8)
"too vague., 293 Through subsections 2929.04(A)(1) to (8), the sentencer is given
clear and specific guidance as to the selection factors that may be weighed against
the defendant's mitigation. Section 2929.03(D)(1) eviscerates the narrowing
achieved by section 2929.04(A). By referring to the "nature and circumstances"
of the aggravating circumstance, section 2929.03(D)(1) gives the sentencer
"open-ended discretion" to impose the death penalty.294 That reference allows the
sentencer to impose death based on the subsections 2929.04(A)(1) to (8) selection
factors plus any other fact in evidence arising from the nature and circumstances
of the offense that the sentencer considers aggravating.
The defense practitioner should challenge this statutory vagueness defect
both on its face and as applied to a specific case. Further, the defense practitioner
at trial should seek to diminish the harm caused by this statutory defect by
requesting clear and specific jury instructions that direct the jury to weigh the
circumstances of the offense only as a mitigating factor. The jury instructions
should also identify the aggravating circumstances applicable to the specific case
and inform the jury that only those aggravating circumstances may be weighed
against the mitigating factors. The jury should also be instructed that the murder
itself is not a selection factor in aggravation to reduce the potential for vagueness
in the weighing process.295
2. The Misleading Statutory Definition of a
Catch-All Mitigating Factor
Section 2929.04(B)(7) of the Ohio Revised Code defines "catch-all
mitigation" as "[a]ny other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the
offender should be sentenced to death. 296 This definition is misleading. It places
291 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997).
292 See supra Part H.B. 1.
293 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990).
294 See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988).
295 See State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 279-80 (Ohio 1984) (stating that the homicide
cannot be weighed as an aggravating circumstance).
296 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 2929.04(B)(7) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
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the focus on whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, which is the
function of an aggravating circumstance. The definition of mitigation found in
section 2929.04(C) more clearly defines "catch-all mitigation" as "any other
factors in mitigation of the imposition297 of the death sentence."29' The defense
practitioner at trial should request that the definition in section 2929.04(C) be
given when defining "catch-all mitigation."
3. Ohio's Statute Requires the Sentencer to Consider Irrelevant
Mitigation Unsupported by Evidence and Not Proffered by the
Defendant
Ohio's former death penalty statute was invalidated in Lockett because the
sentencer's consideration was limited to three mitigating factors.299 In response to
Lockett, the Ohio General Assembly retooled the death penalty statute to afford
the defendant "great latitude" in the presentation of mitigating factors.300 Despite
the good intentions of the General Assembly in attempting to comport the death
penalty statute to Lockett, we believe that section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code contains a provision that is contrary to Lockett.
Section 2929.04(B), in pertinent part, provides that "the court, trial jury, or
panel of three judges shall consider and weigh against the aggravating
circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history, character, and background of the offender, and all of the
following factors....",3'0 Thus, the sentencer is required by this provision to
consider all statutory mitigating factors, such as the circumstances of the offense.
This is contrary to Lockett, in which the United States Supreme Court held that
the capital sentencer cannot "be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."3°2
297 The misleading definition in section 2929.04(B)(7) of the Ohio Revised Code may
cause the sentencer to give catch-all mitigation less than its "full consideration." See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989).
29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
299 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
'0o OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West Supp. 2001); see supra Part II.B.7.
30' OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
302 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (second emphasis added); see Penry,
492 U.S. at 327 ("[T]here is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to
recommend mercy based on mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant." (emphasis
added)).
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Lockett contemplates that the decision of whether to present a particular
mitigating factor to the sentencer necessarily rests within the discretion of the
defense as a matter of strategy. 03 Under Lockett, the sentencer must consider all
relevant mitigation, but only if the defense has "introduced" it to the sentencer or
"proffered" it to the sentencer as a matter of trial strategy.3° Accordingly, the
provision of section 2929.04(B) that mandates, by the use of the word "shall," the
sentencer's consideration of all statutory mitigating factors interferes with the
capital defendant's strategic choice of whether to present particular statutory
mitigating factors to the sentencer. °5
In reliance on Lockett and Penry, the defense practitioner at trial should
request the redaction of inapplicable mitigating factors from jury instructions and
from the sentencing court's consideration. °6 This is especially so when the
"nature and circumstances" of the offense lack any mitigating value. Another
provision of the Ohio Revised Code creates a risk that the nature and
circumstances of the offense will be vaguely construed as an aggravating
selection factor, and this risk is exacerbated when the nature and circumstances of
the offense lack any mitigating value.30 7 A jury instruction that mandates the
consideration of mitigation not proffered by the defense should be challenged as a
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by state
interference, as well as under Lockett and the Due Process Clause.
C. The Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing
1. The Defendant Cannot Plead Guilty to Aggravated Murder with
Aggravating Circumstances and Retain the Jury for the
Penalty Phase
Pursuant to section 2945.06 of the Ohio Revised Code, only a three-judge
panel has jurisdiction on the question of whether to impose capital punishment if
a defendant wishes to plead guilty to the charge of aggravated murder with an
303 Cf Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 979 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that failure to present any
mitigation to capital sentencer was not a reasonable strategic decision).304 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord Penry, 492 U.S. at 327.
... See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; cf Delo v Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 275 (1993) (holding no
due process violation when state refuses to instruct on the mitigating factor when defendant has
not presented evidence to establish it).
3o6 In State v. DePew, the Supreme Court of Ohio made clear that no comment should be
made on statutory mitigating factors not raised by the defense. 528 N.E.2d 542, 557 (Ohio
1988).
317 See supra Part IHI.B.I.
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aggravating circumstance.08 We believe that a capital defendant should be able to
plead guilty to the death eligibility factors and still retain the option of having the
penalty phase before a jury. Ohio's current procedure is flawed because "capital
punishment rests not on a legal but on an ethical judgment .... And if the
decision that capital punishment is the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is
justified because it expresses the community's moral sensibility... it
follows ... that a representative cross-section of the community [should] be given
the responsibility for making that decision."309
Ohio's current procedure of accepting guilty pleas in capital cases places a
defendant at an unfair disadvantage. A defendant who does not contest legal
culpability must nonetheless plead not guilty if he or she wishes to put his or her
life in the hands of a jury on the issue of punishment. This puts the defense in the
unenviable position of having its credibility diminished by entering a
disingenuous plea. Thus, the jury may view credible mitigating evidence with
greater skepticism than it deserves because the defense has lost its credibility at
the culpability phase by contesting uncontestable charges.
A statutory change to allow a guilty defendant to preserve a jury's
participation at the penalty phase would be manageable as a matter of procedure.
The procedure would be quite similar to that which is used when an appellate
court vacates a death sentence for penalty phase error and the trial court must
"impanel a new jury for the hearing" under section 2929.06(B) of the Ohio
Revised Code.310 Further, the Revised Code already permits a jury to consider
and weigh a selection factor that has been proven to the trial judge alone, as the
defendant may try the prior purposeful murder aggravating circumstance to a
judge in a jury trial.31" ' A change to the statute permitting a defendant to admit
legal culpability while taking his or her case to a jury on punishment would be a
rational, manageable change. This change would also further emphasize the
legitimacy of the imposition of a life or death sentence by reinforcing the role of
the jury as "the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death.
3 12
2. A New Jury May Be Seated on Remand from the
Appellate Court for Penalty Phase Error
In the 1981 version of the Ohio Revised Code, a sentence of death could be
308 State v. Green, 689 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ohio 1998); see OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11.
'09 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,481 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.06(B) (West 1997); see infra Part III.C.2.
321 See supra Part Il.A.4.
312 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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imposed only upon a recommendation of death made by the original "trial
jury." 3  Accordingly, if an appellate court vacated a death sentence based on
error at the penalty phase, the defendant could not be sentenced to death by the
trial court on remand. 1 4 This was so because the original "trial jury" had been
discharged and its death penalty recommendation rendered without legal effect by
the appellate court's finding of error.3" 5
Effective July 1, 1996, however, this so-called "loophole" in the sentencing
provisions was closed by the enactment of section 2929.06(B) of the Ohio
Revised Code. 1 6 As the result of section 2929.06(B), the Revised Code now
provides for the trial court to seat a new jury for a new penalty phase whenever an
appellate court vacates the original death sentence based on penalty phase
error.
317
Although section 2929.06(B) is a negative addition to the statute because it
permits the imposition of death without the recommendation of the original trial
jury, it may have some positive effect for defense practitioners.
Section 2929.06(B) may make it more palatable for appellate courts to vacate
death sentences more readily when error infects the original penalty phase
because the defendant no longer gets the windfall of an automatic life sentence
upon remand, as in State v. Penix.
D. Review by Ohio Courts of Appeals Has Been Eliminated
Under the 1981 version of Ohio's death penalty statute and the Ohio
Constitution, a capital defendant convicted and sentenced to death had an appeal
as of right both to the courts of appeals and the state supreme court. Now, for
cases in which the date of the alleged offense occurs on or after January 1, 1995,
the capital defendant may appeal only to the Supreme Court of Ohio, as changes
to the law have eliminated review by the courts of appeals. As the Supreme Court
313 State v. Penix, 513 N.E.2d 744,747-48 (Ohio 1987).
3 14 See id.
315id.
316 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.06(B) (West Supp. 2001).317 This provision only applies to resentencing for penalty phase error after a death
recommendation by the jury has been invalidated on appeal. The Double Jeopardy Clause
would prohibit resentencing if the original sentence of life had been predicated on a legal error,
as the defendant would have been acquitted of the death penalty after a sentencing phase that
resembles a trial. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984) (holding that the trial court
misapplied the "pecuniary gain" selection factor but that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
resentencing because the trial court acquitted the defendant of the death penalty); Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444-45 (1981).
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of Ohio explained in State v. Smith:318
On November 8, 1994, Ohio voters approved Issue I, which amended
Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution to provide for direct
appeal to the court "as a matter of right in cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed." Concurrently, Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio
Constitution was amended to eliminate any jurisdiction of the courts of appeals
"to review on direct appeal a judgment that imposes a sentence of death." The
General Assembly enacted implementing statutory changes, e.g., amendment to
R.C. § 2953.02 by 1995 An. Sub. H.B. No. 4. These changes applied only to
offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995. Defendant's convictions and
sentences are the first case to be considered by this court under the 1994
amendments to the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, the first issue before this
court 'is whether the constitutional amendments to the Ohio Constitution
allowing for the direct appeal of capital cases from the trial court to the Supreme
Court of Ohio pass constitutional muster. After thoroughly reviewing this issue,
we conclude that they do.
3 19
This amendment to the appellate provisions of the Ohio Constitution is
reflected in section 2929.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. 320 As this change
reflects an attempt to give less review and less scrutiny to the imposition of a
death sentence, we consider it to be an imprudent change to the law. The extreme
finality of the death penalty should warrant the availability of every avenue of
judicial scrutiny.
Doubtlessly, the elimination of review by the court of appeals was motivated
by the desire to reduce delay in the review of capital cases and thereby move
defendants along to the executioner more quickly. Here and again we see how
public servants "profess their fealty" 321 to the death penalty for political gain. In
her annual report on death penalty cases, the Attomey General of Ohio credits her
role in eliminating review by the court of appeals, noting that "[a]s a state senator,
Betty D. Montgomery was instrumental in the passage of legislation that sought
to reduce needless delay in death penalty appeals. In 1994, State Issue I
eliminated one level of direct appeal by moving capital cases directly to the Ohio
Supreme Court after sentencing.
' 322
Ironically, this change to the law, motivated by both political and legal
"' 684 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio 1997).
319 Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
320 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West Supp. 2001).
321 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322 OHIO ATrORNEY GENERAL'S CAPITAL CRIMES SECTION, THE STATUS OF DEATH
PENALTY CASES IN OHIO, CAPITAL CRIMEs 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (2000), available at
http://www.ag.state.oh.us/capcrime!2000Report.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
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expediency, has had the opposite effect on the review of capital cases. Now the
burden of appellate review rests entirely with the Supreme Court of Ohio. 323 For
various legitimate reasons, the review of capital appeals has slowed by the
funneling of all direct appeals to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
In addition to reviewing the merits of each capital case, the Supreme Court of
Ohio must now shoulder the burden of reviewing motions for the correction or
supplementation of records, among other ancillary issues attendant to review. In
the bulk of death penalty appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio now bears the full
burden of resolving these issues that were once spread out among the various
districts of the court of appeals. Further, the records in capital cases are often quite
lengthy---records up to ten thousand pages are not unusual---and briefs filed in
capital appeals are often lengthy and involve the complexities of death penalty
jurisprudence. This reality necessarily slows down the review process, especially
when only one court bears the brunt of this lengthy and complex review. Most
important, review on direct appeal of capital cases requires exceptional vigilance
by the reviewing court due to the extreme finality of the death penalty.32 4 This is
true not only for the review of legal errors raised on appeal, but also for the
supreme court's statutory duty to independently review each death sentence.
Each of these concerns comes to the fold as the Supreme Court of Ohio seeks
in good faith to balance the need for careful review of capital cases with concerns
of undue delay. Focusing only on the latter, however, the Attorney General of
Ohio now criticizes the supreme court for taking too long to fulfill its statutory
obligations under section 2929.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. 325 Ironically,
those who complain of delays in the supreme court's review fail to grasp the
critical nexus between any such delay and the elimination of the court of appeals
in the review of capital cases.
IV. OHIO'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE: THE UGLY
Thus far we have discussed both "the good" and "the bad" aspects of Ohio's
death penalty statute. The application of Ohio's capital statutory
framework--even "the good" in it--can also be downright ugly. We thus
conclude our discussion of Ohio's death penalty statute with a critical analysis of
case law that undermines the plain text of Ohio's statutory framework and with
recommendations to the practitioner for combating "the ugly" in Ohio's death
323 As of June 30, 2001, only three death penalty appeals were pending in the various
districts of the Ohio Court of Appeals.
324 Cf Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987) (requiring heightened scrutiny in death
cases even on collateral review).325 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 322, at 14,25-28.
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penalty jurisprudence.
As a general rule, the defense practitioner must be vigilant in his or her efforts
to preserve error for review by the appellate courts. Although a motion in limine
does not preserve error for appellate review,326 we recommend making such
motions so that the defense can gain advance knowledge of how the trial or
sentencing phase will proceed. Because a motion in limine does not preserve
error, the defense practitioner must ensure preservation either through a motion or
an objection.327
On appeal, defense practitioners should challenge unfavorable rulings by
motions and objections. Practitioners must raise claims of ineffective assistance if
trial counsel failed to preserve an issue through a motion or objection. This is
necessary for a federal court to excuse the defendant's procedural default of an
issue.328 Moreover, we strongly encourage defense practitioners to raise multi-
faceted challenges to errors. Certain issues can be appropriately raised as a
substantive claim of error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial
misconduct. Consider every aspect of an issue when crafting claims on your
client's behalf.
The defense practitioner should not shy away from raising issues the
Supreme Court of Ohio has previously rejected. It is both proper and ethical for
the defense practitioner to raise settled issues of law.3 29 Moreover, this is essential
to preserve these issues for federal review. We suggest that the defense
practitioner identify for the court any issue that is settled and indicate that the
court may summarily dispose of this issue.33 °
If the appellate court rejects the defendant's claims, the defense practitioner
326 See State v. Grubb, 503 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ohio 1986) (stating that the party must
introduce by proffer or alternative means evidence precluded by motion in limine in order to
preserve the objection for appeal).
.
27 See State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (Ohio 1996) (citing State v. Wolons, 541
N.E.2d 443, syl. I (Ohio 1989) ("A party does not waive his objections... by failing to
formally object thereto (1) where the record affirmatively shows that a trial court has been fully
apprised of the correct law governing a material issue in dispute, and (2) the requesting party
has been unsuccessful in obtaining the inclusion of that law in the trial court's charge to the
jury.")).325 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (stating that ineffective assistance of
counsel is cause that excuses procedural default).
329 See State v. Poindexter, 520 N.E.2d 568, 570 (Ohio 1988) (recognizing that "certain
issues of law must be raised to preserve a party's right of appeal in federal court"). Compare
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded), with Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452, 2001
U.S. LEXIS 5463 (Oct. 1, 2001) (granting certiorari to revisit the holding in Penry).
330 See Poindexter, 520 N.E.2d at 570 (noting that courts should summarily dispose of
settled issues of law).
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should preserve objections to factual inaccuracies or omitted facts via a motion
for reconsideration and should identify any inconsistent application of the law or
the court's rules in the motion. Further, contradictory case law requiring a
different outcome should be presented to the court in a motion for
reconsideration.
A. Eligibility Factors
1. Only Very Weak Evidence of Prior Calculation and Design Is
Necessary to Prove Section 2903.01(A) Aggravated Murder
Prior to 1974, the State could convict a defendant of capital murder if it
proved that the defendant committed the murder with "deliberate and
premeditated malice."33' The defendant needed only to form a "malicious
purpose" prior to committing the homicide, the formation of which could occur at
the "spur of the moment. '332 In 1974, the Ohio General Assembly eliminated this
type of "instantaneous deliberation" from the capital murder statute by replacing
the element of "deliberate and premeditated malice" with "prior calculation and
design. 333 Prior calculation and design is a "more stringent element" that requires
more than momentary deliberation.334 Now, to prove that a defendant is guilty of
aggravated murder pursuant to section 2903.01 (A) of the Ohio Revised Code, the
State must establish that the defendant killed with prior calculation and design-
that he or she employed "a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision
to kill."
3 35
Despite the change in the law, the Supreme Court of Ohio has treated some
intentional killings as though the defendant committed the murder with prior
calculation and design. Two unfortunate examples of this are State v. Goodwin
336
and State v. Keenan.337 In both cases, the court found the presence of prior
calculation and design despite records that suggested spur of the moment
killings.
338
In Goodwin, the court relied on the purposeful nature of the killing, the
defendant "rais[ing] a gun to the victim and pull[ing] the trigger," and the
33 State v. Cotton, 381 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ohio 1978).




336 703 N.E.2d 1251 (Ohio 1999).
137 689 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 1998).
338 Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d at 1268 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Keenan, 689 N.E.2d at 951 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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planning of a robbery to substantiate the presence of prior calculation and
design.339 Thus, the court based its finding of prior calculation and design on
Goodwin's purpose to kill, the mere act of drawing and firing a weapon, and the
planning of the robbery.340 None of these facts, however, either separately or
together, demonstrate that Goodwin developed a "scheme designed to implement
the calculated decision to kill.,,341 Moreover, setting such a low threshold of proof
means that nearly every intentional killing would meet the criteria for prior
calculation and design.342
In Keenan, the court found prior calculation and design because Keenan
drove the victim around in a truck interrogating him while two men held the
victim at knifepoint.343 Unsatisfied with the victim's lack of information, Keenan
slit his throat and then ordered an accomplice to finish him.344 Nevertheless,
Keenan's actions appear to be a spur of the moment crime, as he did not have a
weapon with him, he did not strike or threaten the victim prior to the murder, and
there was no evidence that Keenan felt any animosity towards the victim prior to
the murder.3 45 Rather than establishing prior calculation and design, the entire
sequence of events could have occurred in a matter of minutes and "appears to
have erupted on the spur of the moment" out of Keenan's frustration.346
Confronted with a plainly intentional killing in both Keenan and Goodwin, a
majority of the court converted the defendant's intent, or purpose to kill, into a
rather questionable finding of prior calculation and design.
For the defense practitioner, preservation of this issue through requests for
any appropriate lesser-included offense instruction is essential, whether it is
murder or voluntary manslaughter. Finally, the element of prior calculation and
design should be challenged in a motion for acquittal.347
2. Only the Most Minimal Connection Is Required Between the
Felony and the Murder to Prove Aggravated Felony Murder
and Its Companion Aggravating Circumstance
Section 2903.01(B) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that a defendant is
guilty of aggravated murder if he or she "purposely cause[s] the death of
"9 Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d at 1269 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
340 Id.
14' Cotton, 381 N.E.2d at 193.
342 Goodwin, 703 N.E.2d at 1269 (Moyer, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
343 Keenan, 689 N.E.2d at 950 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
344 Id.
345 Id. at 950-51.
346 id.
141 OHIO R. CpM. P. 29.
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another... while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing
immediately after committing or attempting to commit," certain felonies. 34' The
same language is repeated as an aggravating circumstance in
section 2929.04(A)(7).3 49 The key word, "while," implies that the predicate
felony and the murder must be causally connected. However, the Supreme Court
of Ohio has not interpreted sections 2903.01(B) and 2929.04(A)(7) to require
more than an attenuated connection between the predicate felony and the murder.
The murder does not need to occur at the same time as, or be caused by, the
underlying felony in order for the defendant to be found guilty of aggravated
murder pursuant to section 2903.01(A) and its corresponding aggravating
circumstance.350 In fact, the defendant need not have considered the commission
of the predicate felony prior to the murder.3 ' Even the technical completion of
the felony prior to the murder, or the murder prior to the felony, does not remove
the defendant from the reach of sections 2903.0 1(B) and 2929.04(A)(7).352
Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio has permitted some findings of
aggravated felony murder and of the felony murder aggravating circumstance to
stand with only the weakest of connections between the felony and the murder. In
State v. McNeill,3 3 for example, the defendant attempted to rob the victim,
removed the victim's car keys, and then fled the scene.354 The underlying
felony--attempted robbery-was complete when McNeill left. Subsequently,
McNeill returned and shot the victim. 355 McNeill argued that this was a new and
separate crime, removing the necessary "while" connection between the felony
and the murder.356 The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected McNeill's arguments,
finding that the killing need only be "directly associated with the predicate felony
as part of one continuous occurrence." 357 Because the attempted robbery and the
murder were closely connected in time and place, and because the "murder would
not and could not have occurred but for the attempted robbery," the requirements
of aggravated felony murder and its specification were met.35 8
Similarly, only the most minimal of connections tied the defendant's murder
341 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (West Supp. 2001).
349 Id. § 2929.04(A)(7) (West Supp. 2001).
350 State v. McNeill, 700 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ohio 1998).
311 State v. Palmer, 687 N.E.2d 685, 709 (Ohio 1997).352 McNeill, 700 N.E.2d at 602.
... 700 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio 1998).354 Id. at 601.
355 Id.356 See id. at 602.357 Id. (citing State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895,903 (Ohio 1989)).358 d. at 602.
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to the felony charged in State v. Berry.35 9 Berry and an accomplice killed his
employer, placed the body in the employer's van, removed his wallet, and then
buried him.3 60 The theft of the van and wallet were not the impetus of the murder,
but rather were incidents to the cover up. Indeed, Berry killed the victim to
retaliate for his employer's near collision with Berry's sister and niece.36'
Nevertheless, the connection between the murder and the felony was sufficient to
fird Berry guilty of aggravated felony murder and the accompanying felony
murder aggravating circumstance.
If the causal connection between the charges of aggravated murder and the
predicate felony are weak, they must be challenged at trial. Trial counsel should
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for acquittal.3 62 If the trial
court denies the motion, counsel should argue to the jury that the "while" element
required to connect the charged felony and the murder is not present.
3. A Capital Defendant May Be Indicted Under Mutually Exclusive
Statutory Alternatives When Charged with the Felony Murder
Aggravating Circumstance
Pursuant to section 2929.04(A)(7) of the Ohio Revised Code, a defendant
who murders during the commission of a felony is eligible for the death penalty
only if the defendant "was the principal offender in the commission of the
aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated
murder with prior calculation and design. 3 63 Simply put, a capital defendant can
be the principal offender in a murder, or he or she can commit aggravated murder
with prior calculation and design, but never both under Ohio law. If there was any
debate on this issue, the Supreme Court of Ohio resolved it in State v. Penix.364
In Penix, the trial court instructed a capital jury on both
section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives. As a result, the jury and the trial court
considered both alternatives when sentencing Penix. The Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed, holding that "principal offender" and "prior calculation and design" are
365not to be charged and proven in the same cause.
Despite the clarity of the statute and the Penix decision, capital defendants
continued to be charged, and capital juries to be instructed on, both
section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives. Confronted with this issue again in State v.
39 650 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio 1995).
360 Id. at 435.
361 See id. at 438.
362 OHIO R. CRiM. P. 29.
363 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (West Supp. 2001).
364 513 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio 1987).365 Id. at 746.
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Moore, 66 the Supreme Court of Ohio modified Penix and sanctioned charging
capital defendants with both alternatives, so long as the indictment is crafted in
the disjunctive "or. '367 The court did find error in Moore--albeit harmless
error--as a result of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to be unanimous
with respect to which alternative was present.368
To the defense practitioner, the danger inherent in cases such as Moore is
obvious: the sentencer could consider both section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives as
aggravating circumstances. This is precisely what happened in State v. Chinn.369
In its sentencing opinion, the trial court found that Chinn was both the principal
offender in the charged murder and that Chinn committed the murder with prior
calculation and design.370 The trial court then proceeded to consider both
alternatives when assessing Chinn's sentence.371
On appeal, Chinn urged the Supreme Court of Ohio to recognize that, if the
trial court made this error, it was likely that the jury did as well. The court rejected
Chinn's "unsupported speculation." 372It was "clear" to the court that Chinn's jury
found that he was the principal offender; the only trial issue was identity and,
consequently, Chinn was either the principal offender or he was not guilty of the
charges.
373
Chinn is an unfortunate example of how the review of a death sentence can
be "qualitatively different" in Ohio.37 4 A trial judge, who presumably has more
legal knowledge and is more familiar with statutory interpretation than the jury,
incorrectly weighed both section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives when it sentenced
Chinn. Indeed, somehow the court credited the jury with more legal capability
than the trial court. We believe it is likely that Chinn's jury made the same
mistake as the trial court.
There are ways for the defense practitioner to protect the client from the
court's hostile interpretation of the section 2929.04(A)(7) specification. Penix, for
example, remains good law and should be relied upon. In addition, the
practitioner should make efforts to have the prosecution elect the
section 2929.04(A)(7) theory it wants to proceed under at sentencing. If the
166 89 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 1998).367 Id. at 17 (citing State v. Cook, 605 N.E.2d 70, 82-83 (Ohio 1992)).368 Id. The error was harmless in Moore because the jury convicted Moore of committing
the murder with prior calculation and design in the first count of his indictment. Id.
369 709 N.E.2d 1166 (Ohio 1999).





374See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (citing Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
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prosecution refises to so elect, the practitioner must insist on a unanimous verdict
on one of the alternatives. This is the constitutionally mandated narrowing that
must occur in every capital case.375 Counsel should rely on Apprendi v. New
Jersey376 when making these requests. Per Apprendi, the jury must find any facts,
excluding a prior conviction, that render a defendant eligible for death.377 Finally,
the defense practitioner should emphasize in closing argument that the jury must
unanimously find that only one of the alternatives exists---both cannot be
present.
378
If practitioners on appeal find themselves without findings on either
alternative at sentencing, they should review the facts and determine if the case
can be distinguished from Chinn. The court held that Chinn had to be the
principal offender, or not involved in the crime, because identity was the only
issue in the case. 379 The evidence will not be so tidy in every capital case,
however, and can aid the defense practitioner in establishing prejudicial error.
This error would be prejudicial, for example, if your client and a co-defendant are
both charged with committing an aggravated felony murder and the prosecution
presents evidence to support both section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives. In this
instance, failure to have fact-findings as to which alternative is present is
especially prejudicial. The jury could simply arrive at a patchwork verdict, with
six jurors believing that the defendant is the principal offender and the other six
believing that the defendant committed the murder with prior calculation and
design.
On appeal, the defense practitioner should be vigilant in his or her review of
the transcript. Beyond making typical challenges to denied motions, overruled
objections, and lack of unanimity, the practitioner should challenge as misconduct
any suggestion by the prosecutor that both section 2929.04(A)(7) alternatives may
be considered.
4. A Capital Defendant May Be Convicted of Multiple Homicide
Counts for a Single Murder
Under Ohio law, capital defendants can face more than one aggravated
murder charge for a single killing. This does not violate section 2941.25(A) of the
371 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,305 (1987).
376 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
171 Id. at 488-89.
378 See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1998); Simmons v. South Carolina,
512 U.S. 154, 174 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that counsel's argument was
relevant consideration when the instructional error is raised).
179 Chinn, 709 N.E.2d at 1177.
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Ohio Revised Code38° because the Supreme Court of Ohio has interpreted
"conviction" to require both a guilt determination and an imposition of
sentence."' Surprisingly, however, the court permits the jury to consider more
than one count of aggravated murder for a single killing at the sentencing
phase.382
The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently rejected capital defendants'
claims of prejudice.383 The court refuses to find that the consideration of multiple
counts by the jury "unfairly affect[s] the penalty hearing."384 Even where an
actual violation of section 2941.25(A) occurs-where the trial court sentences the
defendant on multiple aggravated murder counts for a single killing-the court
holds that this is merely "procedural" error and "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 38 5 In fact, the court's independent review can cure this error.
38 6
The defense practitioner should be concemed over presenting multiple
aggravated murder counts to the jury at sentencing for several reasons. First, the
jury may weigh the aggravating circumstances from each count "collectively and
improperly," rather than treating each count separately.387 Second, presenting
multiple counts might cause jurors to believe that the crime or crimes proven are
particularly "heinous because of the number of charges stemming from the
death[]."'3 88 Third, the jury could consider the multiple counts as non-statutory
aggravating circumstances.389
To avoid the prejudice of multiple aggravated murder counts at sentencing,
the defense practitioner should request that the prosecution elect the count with
which it wishes to proceed. The practitioner should articulate how the client will
3s0 Section 2941.25(A) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that "[w]here the same conduct
by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A) (West 1997).
381 State v. Poindexter, 520 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Ohio 1998) (citing State v. Henderson, 389
N.E.2d 494,498 (Ohio 1972)); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.25(A) (West 1997).
382 See State v. O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d 73, 87 (Ohio 2000); State v. Goff, 694 N.E.2d 916,
926 (Ohio 1998); State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 17 (Ohio 1998); State v. Palmer, 687 N.E.2d
685, 709 (Ohio 1997); State v. Waddy, 588 N.E.2d 819, 836 (Ohio 1992),
313 See, e.g., O'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 87; Moore, 689 N.E.2d at 17; Palmer, 687 N.E.2d at
709; State v. Woodard, 623 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Ohio 1993); Waddy, 588 N.E.2d at 836.
34 0'Neal, 721 N.E.2d at 87 (citing Woodard, 623 N.E.2d at 81).
383 State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523,539 (Ohio 1998); see Moore, 689 N.E.2d at 17.
116 Moore, 689 N.E.2d at 17 (citing State v. Cook, 605 N.E.2d 70, 82 (Ohio 1992)) (stating
that independent review "can cure any errors that taint the jury's sentencing verdict"). But see
infra Part IV.D.2.
311 Waddy, 588 N.E.2d at 838.
38 Palmer, 687 N.E.2d at 709.
389 Id.
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be prejudiced if an election is not made, as speculation will not suffice to prove
prejudice on appeal.
5. Duress Is Not a Defense to Aggravated Murder
Arguing that someone else forced the defendant to commit the act in question
is the essence of "duress," which can be a defense to the commission of a crime.
To establish the defense of duress, the defendant must demonstrate that he or she
possessed "a sense of immediate death or serious bodily injury" if he or she failed
to perform the directed acts.3 90 The use of force must control the defendant's will
"during the entire time he or she commits the act," such that he or she "cannot
safely withdraw."'39'
Duress is recognized as an affirmative defense to all crimes.3 92 The common
law excluded this defense, however, where the charge was murder of an innocent
person.393 It was not until State v. Getsy394 that the Supreme Court of Ohio
addressed whether duress could be asserted by a capital defendant against charges
of aggravated murder.
In Getsy, the defendant claimed that a third party with mob connections
coerced him into committing murder via threats. Although the trial court held that
duress could properly be asserted to defend against both the underlying felony
and the felony aggravated murder charge, the court did not charge the jury on
duress based on its finding of insufficient evidence.3 95 Getsy then raised this
failure to instruct on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that
duress is a defense to "certain felonies. 396 Moreover, the court noted that if
duress may validly be asserted as a defense to the underlying felony in a felony
murder case, then the defendant could not be convicted of aggravated murder.3 97
The court incorrectly rejected duress as a defense to aggravated murder 98 through
reliance on the common law prohibition against asserting duress to defend against
the murder of an innocent person.3 99 The court found additional support for its
"0 State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 885 (Ohio 1998) (citing State v. Cross, 391 N.E.2d
319, 323 (Ohio 1979)).
391 Id. (citing State v. Good, 165 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960)).
392 Id. at 884 (citing State v. Sappienza, 95 N.E. 381 (Ohio 1911)).
393 id.
394 702 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio 1998).
395 Id.
396 Id. at 884.
397 Id. (citing State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (Ohio 1976)).
398 But cf Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 58-59 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) ("Defining mens rea to eliminate the exculpatory value of voluntary intoxication
does not offend a 'fundamental principle ofjustice.'").
399 Getsy, 702 N.E.2d at 885.
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decision in section 2929.04(B)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, 4°° in which the
General Assembly included duress as a mitigating factor.40' The court thus
reasoned that the General Assembly did not intend for duress to be a defense
against aggravated murder.4°2
Nevertheless, we believe Getsy does not completely preclude assertion of
duress as a defense in a capital murder case. Getsy precluded only defending
against the charge of aggravated murder with duress. There may be additional
charges that the defendant faces where duress may be appropriately presented as a
defense. Further, the defendant can use duress to defend against the aggravating
circumstances that elevate his or her crime to a capital offense. In Getsy, the court
indicated that duress "arguably" could have been presented as a defense to the
murder-for-hire aggravating circumstance.403  Additionally, the defense
practitioner cannot forget that being charged with a crime gives the defendant
numerous powerful rights--the right, for example, to be heard in his or her
defense.4°4 Moreover, the defendant must have a "meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense." 0'° If, but for Getsy, the facts of the defendant's case
dictate a defense of duress, the defense practitioner should argue that the
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated if he or she is
precluded from presenting evidence of duress.
6. Capital Defendants May Not Present Expert Psychological Testimony
During the Trial Phase to Disprove Specific Intent
As previously discussed,0 6 aggravated murder is a specific intent crime.0 7
400 Section 2929.04(B)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code provides that the trier of fact may
consider "[w]hether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(2) (West Supp. 2001).
401 Id.
402 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellant's
death sentence in part because Ohio's statutory framework limited the consideration of the
defendant's lack of specific intent to kill as a mitigating factor. 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). Of
course, lack of a specific intent to kill would also be a defense against aggravated murder in
Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio's reasoning that because a factor is mitigating, it cannot also
be a defense to the crime, is inconsistent with Lockett.
403 702 N.E.2d at 886; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(2) (West Supp. 2001)
("The offense was committed for hire.").
404 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
405 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citing California v. Trombetta, 476 U.S.
479, 485 (1984)).
406 See supra Part H.A.2.
407 See State v. Coleman, 525 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ohio 1988).
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Absent the presence of specific intent or purpose to kill, a defendant cannot be
guilty of aggravated murder. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, limits the
criminal defendant's ability to disprove intent to kill. Expert testimony respecting
the impact of alcohol, drugs, or mental illness on a defendant's ability to form a
specific intent to kill is not permitted in Ohio.
408
As to purpose, the trial court in State v. Cooey4° precluded the presentation
of expert testimony that Cooey was so impaired by the effects of alcohol, drugs,
and a mental disorder that he did not have the capacity to form specific intent.
410
The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Cooey's challenge to the trial court's ruling,
reiterating its holding in State v. Wilcox 4 that psychiatric testimony in a capital
case, unrelated to insanity, may only be offered at the mitigation phase.41 2 The
court based its decision to reject such testimony on two grounds. First, the court
distrusted the psychiatric expert's ability to "fine-tune" a sane offender's "degree
of capacity."' 13 Second, Ohio does not recognize the defense of diminished
capacity414  and permitting such evidence would be permitting that
defense-albeit under a different name.
415
The outcome was no different when the defendant sought to proffer similar
evidence to disprove the element of prior calculation and design. In State v.
Huertas,416 the defendant sought to offer expert testimony regarding the effects of
intoxication and the possibility of blackouts to negate the element of prior
calculation and design.41 7 The defendant argued that he was precluded from
presenting evidence that would have demonstrated his inability to form the
statutorily required specific intent to kill4t8 as permitted by State v. Fox.41 9 Citing
Cooey, the court reiterated that expert psychiatric testimony in a capital case may
only be offered if it relates to sanity or is offered at the sentencing phase.420 It is
permissible, however, to present lay testimony that the defendant was, for
example, too intoxicated to have formed specific intent.42 Nevertheless, such
401 State v Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ohio 1990); State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895,
906 (Ohio 1989).
409 544 N.E.2d 895 (Ohio 1989).410 Id. at 906.
41l 436 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Ohio 1982).
412 Cooey, 544 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 533).
41 544 N.E.2d at 906.
414 See Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d at 530.
415 Cooey, 544 N.E.2d at 906.
416 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990).
41 Id. at 1065.
4 18 Id.
419 428 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1981).
420 Huertas, 553 N.E.2d at 1065 (citing Cooey, 544 N.E.2d at 895).
421 Cooey, 544 N.E.2d at 906 (citing Fox, 428 N.E.2d at 412).
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evidence is a poor substitute for the testimony that an expert psychiatrist would
present.
We believe that the Supreme Court of Ohio should modify Wilcox and adopt
diminished capacity as a defense to aggravated murder. In State v. Scott,422 the
court addressed and rejected the question of whether a mentally ill, but competent
person could be executed.411 Although not impacting on legal culpability,
permitting the defense of diminished capacity would provide the jury with an
additional vehicle to address the death eligibility of a severely mentally ill
defendant. For a defendant such as Scott, who suffered from the biologically-
based illness of chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia,424 such a consideration
could have spared his life. Thus, Ohio should reevaluate whether it wants to
engage in the practice of executing men and women who suffer from serious
mental illness.425
If a defense practitioner learns from an expert that the defendant was unable
to form the specific intent necessary to prove him or her guilty of aggravated
murder, it is essential that evidence be offered to the trial court. The defendant has
a right to be heard in his or her defense.426 Moreover, the opportunity to defend
must be "meaningful" and "complete. ' 4 7 The defense practitioner must exercise
those rights for the client.
We suggest that the defense practitioner make efforts to gain a working
knowledge of psychological disorders. Such knowledge will allow the
practitioner to "think outside the box" about the defendant's psychological
problems in the context of the facts presented in his or her case. If the defendant
suffers from battered woman's syndrome, battered child syndrome, post-
traumatic stress disorder, or a paranoid personality, expert testimony regarding
those disorders may be proper to support a theory of self-defense at trial given the
circumstances of the crime.428 The defense practitioner should talk to the expert
422 748 N.E.2d 11, 12 (Ohio 2001).
423 See id.
424 See id. at 19 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant has chronic,
undifferentiated schizophrenia). "Schizophrenia is an inability to recognize reality in some way,
marked by delusions and perceptual distortions. There is no cure for schizophrenia ..." Estates
of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ohio 1997).
41PSee Scott, 748 N.E.2d at 20 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); see also State v. Berry, 650 N.E.2d
433,444 (Ohio 1995) (Wright, J., dissenting).
426 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
421 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479,485 (1984)).
421 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06(B) (West 1997) (permitting expert testimony
respecting battered woman's syndrome to support a claim of self-defense); State v. Nemeth,
694 N.E.2d 1332, 1341 (Ohio 1998) (allowing expert testimony respecting battered child
syndrome where self-defense is asserted); State v. Purcell, 669 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ohio Ct. App.
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about the facts of the case and how those circumstances may have interacted with
the defendant's mental condition.
An unfortunate example of a missed opportunity for such litigation is found
in State v. Stojetz.429 Stojetz, an inmate at Madison Correctional Institute, was
charged with killing a juvenile inmate. There was testimony presented at trial that
the victim attacked another juvenile just prior to the murder and that he threatened
to kill Stojetz.430 What the jury did not learn during the trial phase was that Stojetz
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).431 The interplay of the
victim's violent actions, his threats, the prison environment, and Stojetz's PTSD
should have been utilized as a defense during the trial phase.432
B. Selection Factors and Sentencing Procedures
1. A Capital Defendant May Not Present Residual
Doubt as a Mitigating Factor
In her concurring opinion in Frandin v. Lynaugh,43 Justice O'Connor
defined residual doubt as "[a] lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind
that exists somewhere between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and 'absolute
certainty.' 434 Although residual doubt can be an effective argument in certain
cases,435 it is not a constitutionally required mitigating factor.436
We believe the effectiveness of residual doubt as a mitigating factor can be
seen in Ohio's case law. Residual doubt was part of the Supreme Court of Ohio's
rationale for reversing the death sentence in State v. Watson.437 Before 1998,
moreover, the court repeatedly recognized residual doubt as a mitigating factor in
1995) (permitting expert testimony respecting post-traumatic stress disorder where self-defense
is asserted); State v. Thomas, 468 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (finding error in the
court's exclusion of expert testimony respecting paranoid personality where self-defense is
asserted).
429 705 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio 1999).
430 Id. at 345.
431 See id. at 334, 346.
432 Stojetz argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present such evidence.
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio did not address this specific issue, the court rejected
Stojetz's ineffective assistance of counsel (JAC) claim. Id. at 337.
413 487 U.S. 164 (1988).434 Id. at 188 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
435 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986) (citing Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226,
247-48 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
436 Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174.
437 572 N.E.2d 97, 111 (Ohio 1991).
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capital cases.438
However, residual doubt did not survive the Supreme Court of Ohio's review
in State v. McGuire.439 In McGuire, the court removed what can be one of the
capital defendant's most compelling weapons at sentencing. Because residual
doubt is unrelated to the "nature and circumstances of the offense[] and the
history, character, and background" of the offense, it is not a proper mitigating
factor.4
40
Despite McGuire, we believe that residual doubt is not necessarily dead and
buried. Although residual doubt may not be offered as a mitigating factor, it may
sometimes be offered as rebuttal evidence by the defense. The prosecution
frequently argues that the capital defendant deserves the death penalty--at least in
part--because of his or her legal guilt, as opposed to the defendant's moral guilt.
Such an argument triggers a powerful right for the defendant. Capital defendants
have a recognized right to rebut the factors the prosecution relies on at
sentencing.44' If the prosecution argues that the defendant's legal guilt makes him
or her deserving of death, the defense practitioner can appropriately argue residual
doubt as part of the defendant's due process right to rebut the sentencing factors
relied on by the prosecution.
On appeal, defense practitioners must continue to challenge McGuire and the
limitations it places on the defense practitioner. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
Ohio has held that McGuire can be applied retroactively.442 If McGuire is
retroactively applied, a challenge based on the Ex Post Facto Clause might be
appropriate.443
Efforts respecting residual doubt should not stop at the courthouse. The
Supreme Court of Ohio does not necessarily have the final word on residual
doubt. This is one area in which a difference can be made by contacting local
legislators and asking that they incorporate residual doubt into the list of
mitigating factors enumerated in section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code.
Indeed, although the Federal Constitution may not require juries to consider
residual doubt, the authority to do so is within the province of the Ohio General
Assembly.
438 See, e.g., id.; see also State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915, 931 (Ohio 1992); State v.
Gillard, 533 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ohio 1988).
439 686 N.E.2d 1112 (Ohio 1997).
440 Id. at 1123.
441 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.l (1986); id. at 9 (Powell, J., concurring)
(citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
42 State v. Bey, 709 N.E.2d 484, 503 (Ohio 1999).
441See Booth-El v. Nuth, 140 F. Supp. 2d 495, 517 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that
Maryland's removal of intoxication-induced diminished capacity as a mitigating factor violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause).
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2. Ohio's Catchall Mitigating Factor Is Limited Only to Those Factors
Specifically Enumerated in Section 2929.04(B)
The Supreme Court of Ohio has severely limited the reach of
section 2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code. In McGuire, the court adopted the
restrictive interpretation of section 2929.04(B)4" first found in Justice Resnick's
dissenting opinion in State v. Watson.445 In Watson, Justice Resnick protested the
recognition of residual doubt as a mitigating factor. Because residual doubt was
not mentioned in section 2929.04(B), it could not be a mitigating factor." 6 Justice
Resnick argued that residual doubt could not be considered under the section
2929.04(B)(7) catchall because it had to be read in relation to section
2929.04(B). 47 Section 2929.04(B) "allows consideration only of those other
factors relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to
death," which are the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history,
character, and background of the offender.448 Essentially, "any other factor"
means only those factors specifically identified elsewhere in
section 2929.04(B). 449
Justice Pfeifer's concurrence in McGuire notes the strained logic adopted by
the court to rid Ohio of residual doubt. Indeed, there is a simple, logical meaning
to section 2929.04(B)(7). "Any other factor" requires consideration of those
factors that are not considered in "any other portion of [section] 2929.04(B)." 450
Support for Justice Pfeifer's position can be found in the Ohio Revised Code
itself. Pursuant to section 2929.04(C), "[t]he defendant shall be given great
latitude in the presentation of evidence of the factors listed in division (B) of this
section and of any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of
death."45 McGuire gives no latitude and renders section 2929.04(B)(7)
meaningless surplusage. "Any other factors that are relevant to... whether the
offender should be sentenced to death"4" 2 does not mean any other factor
according to McGuire. Instead, only those factors that are already specifically
444 McGuire, 686 N.E.2d at 1112, 1122-23.
44' 572 N.E.2d 97, 111-13 (Ohio 1991) (Resnick, J., dissenting).
4461d. at 112.
447/d.
448 Id. But see State v. Murphy, 747 N.E.2d 765, 800 (Ohio 2001) (weighing the victim's
family's request that the defendant be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in its
independent review).
449 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1997).450 McGuire, 686 N.E.2d at 1124 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
451 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(C) (West 1997).
452 Id. § 2929.04(B)(7).
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enumerated elsewhere are "any other factors.' A4
McGuire's restrictive interpretation of section 2929.04(B)(7) might seem to
severely limit the capital defendant's ability to present mitigating evidence. This
interpretation, however, is an anomaly. Although the Supreme Court of Ohio has
limited the weight it has given to many mitigating factors in its independent
sentence review, residual doubt is the only mitigating factor that the court has
rejected in its entirety.
The court's independent review in State v. Murphy45 4 also suggests that its
restrictive interpretation of section 2929.04(B)(7) in McGuire is an anomaly. In
Murphy, the court considered and weighed requests by the victim's family that
Murphy be given a life sentence when assessing the appropriateness of Murphy's
death sentence.45' These requests were weighed as mitigation despite the fact that
they were not a part of the defendant's character, the record, or the circumstances
of the offense.
As a result, the defense practitioner should continue to present any legitimate
factor they deem will mitigate the death penalty in their client's case. The
practitioner should rely on Murphy and section 2929.04(C) to support the
broadest presentation of mitigation possible, noting that the factors weighed by
the court in Murphy can defeat McGuire's restrictive interpretation of section
2929.04(B)(7).
3. The Mitigating Factor ofAge Only Refers to Chronological Age
Pursuant to Section 2929.04(B)(4) of the Ohio Revised Code, a capital
defendant's youth is a factor that mitigates against the imposition of the death
penalty.4 6 In State v. Rogers,45 7 the defendant was a forty-two year old man and,
consequently, would be seemingly precluded from asserting
section 2929.04(B)(4) as a mitigating factor. The defendant presented expert
psychological testimony, however, that although his chronological age was forty-
two, certain psychological deficits resulted in a mental age equivalent to a ten or
twelve year old child.4 ' Thus, the defendant argued that "youth," as used in
section 2929.04(B)(4),4'9  refers to the defendant's mental rather than
453 id.
454 747 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 2001).
415 Id. at 800.
456 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (West 1997).
457 478 N.E.2d 984 (Ohio 1985).
411 Id. at 993.
09 Rogers made the identical arguments with respect to the use of "age" in
sections 2929.02(A) and 2929.023 of the Ohio Revised Code. Id.
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chronological age.460
The Supreme Court of Ohio did not interpret "age" so broadly. Finding no
contrary indications, the court gave "age" its plain meaning-chronological
age.461 The court noted, however, that Rogers's mental age would be a "weighty
factor mitigating against the death penalty 462 that could appropriately be
considered under section 2929.04(B)(3). 463
The defense practitioner representing a client who is not chronologically
youthful, but who has a youthful mental age, must present this mitigating
evidence to the sentencer. The practitioner should also request that the jury be
instructed on youth as a mitigating factor. Rogers is contrary to Eddings v.
Oklahoma,464 which held that the mitigating factor of youth "is more than: a
chronological fact[,]" 465 and the practitioner should rely heavily on this
contradiction. Additionally, there are several alternative routes through which the
sentencer can appropriately consider this type of mitigation. Per Rogers, this
evidence can be considered under section 2929.04(B)(3) of the Ohio Revised
Code. If the evidence presented does not rise to the level-, of
section 2929.04(B)(3), evidence of the defendant's mental deficits can also be
appropriately considered as part of the defendant's history, character, and
background 466 or under the catchall mitigating factor.467 Moreover, since the
Supreme Court of Ohio found that a mental age of ten or twelve was an
"extremely weighty factor' 468 in mitigation of the death penalty, emphasis should
be placed on mental age in arguments respecting the appropriateness of the death
penalty before a jury or under the appellate court's independent sentence review.
Although the court did not vacate the death sentence in Rogers, combining the
"extremely weighty' 469 factor of the defendant's youthful mental age with the
other mitigating factors may give the practitioner a compelling argument to spare




463 Section 2929.04(B)(3) provides that "[w]hether, at the time of committing the offense,
the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct to the requirements
of the law." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (West 1997).
464 455 U.S. 104 (1982).461 Id. at 115.
466 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1997).
467 See id. § 2929.04(B)(7); see also State v. Otte, 660 N.E.2d 711, 722 (Ohio 1996)
(stating that the potential of addiction can be considered as mitigating under either
section 2929.04(B)(3) or 2929.04(B)(7)).
468 State v. Rogers, 478 N.E.2d 984, 997 (Ohio 1985).
469 Id.
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4. A Capital Defendant Can Waive His or Her
Presentation of Mitigating Evidence
The Supreme Court of Ohio first confronted a convicted capital defendant
who wished to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence in State v. Tyler.47 °
In Tyler, the defendant would not allow defense counsel to call any mitigation
witnesses. 471 Thus, the only "mitigation" presented was the defendant's unswom
statement in which he told the jurors to sentence him to death if they believed him
to be guilty.472 In reviewing Tyler, the court recognized that the defendant's right
to present mitigating evidence stemmed from his or her right to be treated with
dignity.473 That right to be treated with dignity, however, also allows the
defendant to chose not to present mitigating evidence.474 Tyler thus provides
capital defendants with the right to preclude the presentation of all mitigating
evidence.
Several years later, the court confronted a twist to the issue in Tyler in State v.
Ashworth.475 Ashworth pled guilty to capital murder and waived the presentation
of mitigating evidence for the express purpose of being sentenced to death.476 In
response, the court developed the procedures to be followed when a capital
defendant wishes to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence. First, there
must be an inquiry on the record into whether the waiver is knowing and
voluntary.477 Second, the trial court must determine that the defendant is
competent and understands his right to present mitigation. 478 To ensure complete
understanding, the defendant must be informed of several things, including his or
her right to present mitigating evidence, how the sentencer uses such evidence,
and the resultant effect should the defendant fail to present mitigating evidence.479
Finally, the trial court should inquire as to whether the defendant wants to waive
his or her right to present mitigating evidence.480 The trial court must then make
findings of fact as to the defendant's understanding of his or her rights and the
470 553 N.E.2d 576, 583 (Ohio 1990).
471 Id.
472 Id.
471 Id. at 585 (citing Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV.
1363, 1383 (1988)).
474 id.
47' 706 N.E.2d 1231 (Ohio 1999).
476 Id. at 1236.
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4811
waiver.
Beyond explaining the right to present mitigation and the effects of foregoing
the presentation of such evidence, the trial court in Ashworth also ordered that a
competency evaluation be conducted on the defendant.482 Prior to Ashworth, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the mere fact of waiver does not call a
defendant's competency into question.483 Moreover, the court indicated that a
competency evaluation was not a necessary precondition to accepting the
defendant's waiver of the presentation of mitigating evidence.484 Although the
court did not fault the trial court in Ashworth for conducting a competency
hearing and advised trial courts to be cognizant of any actions that might call the
defendant's actions into question, the court reaffirmed that a competency hearing
was not a necessary prerequisite to waiving presentation of mitigating
evidence.485
The battle waged by defense counsel in Tyler and Ashworth is the battle of
who in society may decide what penalty is appropriate in a capital case. Society
has an interest in executing only those persons who meet the requirements of
Ohio's death penalty statute.486 There is also a societal interest that criminal
defendants not use the death penalty as a form of state-assisted suicide.487 Beyond
these interests, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution places a
high premium on the reliability of the decision to sentence a capital defendant to
death.4
88
Despite the myriad of concerns against allowing a capital defendant to
determine the punishment that will be meted out, the court found in Ashworth that
there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the societal and Eighth Amendment
interests are protected.489 So long as a capital defendant is not automatically
sentenced to death upon conviction, the absence of mitigation in a given case does
not render the death penalty unconstitutional. 490 The court refused to move away
from its contention that, because Ohio's death penalty statute did not expressly
require the presentation of mitigating evidence, it had to include the right not to
481 Id. The procedures announced in Ashworth are not to be retroactively applied. State v.
Cowans, 717 N.E.2d 298, 314 (Ohio 1999); see infra Part IV.D.3.482 Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d at 1236.
413 State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576, 585 (Ohio 1990).
484 Id. at 585 (citing Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1984)).
485 Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d at 1237.




490 Id. at 1239 (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990)).
2002]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
present such evidence.491
We believe that the Ashworth decision creates significant problems with
regard to the court's statutory obligation to reweigh the aggravating
circumstances and mitigating factors, as well as its obligation to address the
proportionality of the death penalty in every capital case.4 92 The court cannot
fulfill this function if the capital defendant can withhold from it the information
necessary for that review. The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that it
cannot fulfill its duty to engage in a "thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review
to consider the totality of the circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other
capital cases" if a capital defendant precludes the presentation of mitigating
evidence.493 The necessity to consider mitigation "applies with no less force when
a defendant argues in favor of the death penalty[] and even when the defendant
asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence.
'A94
Based on this necessity, Florida now requires that a pre-sentence
investigation report (PSI) be generated in every case in which the defendant does
not challenge the death penalty and refuses to present mitigating evidence.495
Included within that report is evidence relating to mental health problems, family
background, and school records.496 The Supreme Court of Florida has placed on
the prosecutor the affirmative duty to place in the record all evidence in its
possession that is of a mitigating nature.497 If either the pre-sentence report or the
records submitted by the prosecutor alert the trial court to the "probability of
significant mitigation," the trial court can call its own witnesses to testify
491 id.
492 Section 2929.05(A) provides:
Whenever a sentence of death is imposed ... the supreme court shall review upon appeal
the sentence of death at the same time that they review the other issues in the case.
The... supreme court shall review the judgment in the case and the sentence of death
imposed... in the same manner that they review other criminal cases, except that they
shall review and independently weigh all of the facts and other evidence disclosed in the
record in the case and consider the offense and the offender to determine whether the
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the
mitigating factors in the case, and whether the sentence of death is appropriate. In
determining whether the sentence of death is appropriate ... the supreme court shall
consider whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
493 Florida v. Muhammed, 782 So. 2d 343, 364-65 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Porter v. State,
564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).494 Id. at 363 (quoting Farr v. State, 621 So. 2d 1368, 1369 (Fla. 1993)).
495 Id.
496 Id. at 363-64.
4 9 7 Id. (footnote omitted).
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regarding mitigating evidence.498 The trial court also has the ability to appoint
counsel to present such mitigating evidence.499 Florida is not alone, as similar
procedures have been adopted in New Jersey and Georgia 00 The Supreme Court
of Ohio should have endorsed similar suggestions made in both Tyler and
Ashworth.
Despite Tyler and Ashworth, however, the defense practitioner still has
options when his or her client refuses to permit the presentation of mitigating
evidence. The defense practitioner should look carefully at the defendant, his or
her history, and his or her current behavior so as to alert the trial court to any
suggestion of incompetency. Although a defense attorney should generally not
request a PSI,5°' the practitioner should try to gain the defendant's consent to such
a request if the defendant will not permit the presentation of mitigating evidence.
Indeed, at the very least, a PSI will provide the court with something to consider
when assessing penalty. The defense practitioner should look to the facts of the
case and alert the trial court to any potential mitigating evidence already found in
the record and in the trial phase evidence. 02 Finally, either counsel or standby
counsel should proffer for the record available mitigation, witnesses, and any
additional mitigation inquiry.
5. The Jury Need Not Be Instructed on Specific Mitigating Factors
At the conclusion of the mitigation phase in State v. Goff,5 °3 the defendant
requested that the trial court instruct the jury on several specific mitigating
factors.5° The defendant's logic was that the capital sentencer cannot "refuse to
498 Id. at 364.
499 Id.
500 See Muhammed, 782 So. 2d at 364 (citing State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 983, 992 (N.J.
1988)); Morrison v. Georgia, 373 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ga. 1988).
501 Section 2929.03(D)(1), in pertinent part, provides that "[w]hen death may be imposed
as a penalty, the court, upon the request of the defendant, shall require a pre-sentence
investigation to be made...." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997). The
defense practitioner should generally not request a PSI because it may include information that
is harmful to the client, such as a prior record. Moreover, any mitigation that can be provided by
a PSI can also be obtained through a proper investigation by defense counsel.
502 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (West 1997). For example, mitigating
evidence may be any suggestion that the client was drinking at the time of the offense, State v.
Campbell, 738 N.E.2d 1178, 1192 (Ohio 2000), that the victim induced or facilitated the crime,
State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1243 (Ohio 1999), or that the victim provoked the
offense, State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 451,459-60 (Ohio 1989).
503 694 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1998).
5 4Id. at 922.
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consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence."' 05 The Supreme
Court of Ohio rejected the defendant's contentions, however, and held that the
trial court does not have to instruct the jury on non-statutory mitigating factors.50 6
Citing to Buchanan v. Angelone, °7 the court indicated that the failure to provide
such instruction violates neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. °8 So long as the court's instructions do not foreclose
the consideration of relevant mitigating evidence, there will be no error in
refusing to instruct the jury on specific mitigating factors. 09
Although the Constitution may not require such instructions, there is no
reason why the defense practitioner cannot request that the court give them. The
Constitution provides merely a threshold level of protection-one that a trial court
can exceed if it deems appropriate. Moreover, although Buchanan forecloses
some success in litigating this type of claim, we believe it does not foreclose all
success, particularly if practitioners are creative in their arguments. The defense
practitioner must evaluate the circumstances of the case to determine if it is
distinguishable from Buchanan. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision to uphold
the instructions given in Buchanan was based on a variety of factors. First, the
instructions did not foreclose consideration of any mitigating evidence.5 '0 Second,
the context of the instructions-several days of testimony on mitigating evidence
and extensive arguments of both counsel-resolved any doubt in favor of a
finding that the jury was not foreclosed from considering mitigation.51 1
Alternatively, the defense practitioner should look for indications of juror
confusion expressed in the form of a written question. If the jurors do not
understand what is, or is not, mitigating evidence, counsel should request
additional instructions that provide more specific guidance."1 2
505 Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982)).
506 Id. at 923.
507 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998).
508 Id. at 923 (citing Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 279).
509 Id.
510 Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 277.
511 Id. at 278-79.
512 But see State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1171 (Ohio 2001) (noting that it is not
erroneous to preclude the questioning of jurors at voir dire concerning specific mitigating
factors in hopes of reducing the chance ofjuror confusion).
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6. The Prosecutor May Comment That the Defendant's Statement Is
Not Given Under Oath and the Prosecutor Has Wide Latitude in
Rebutting the Defendant's Unsworn Statement
As previously discussed,"13 one of the shining stars of Ohio's capital statute is
the defendant's ability to make an unswom statement at the penalty phase
pursuant to section 2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code. This opportunity
allows the defendant to speak to the sentencer without subjecting him or herself to
cross-examination-a powerful tool for the defense. However, the Supreme
Court of Ohio's interpretation of section 2929.03(D)(1) is eroding its purpose.
In Griffin v. California,1 4 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a
defendant's conviction and death sentence after the prosecutor commented on the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to silence.51 5 Such commentary imposed an
impermissible penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right.516 By penalizing
the defendant for the exercise of his rights, the right itself is decimated.5" 7 Thus,
the court set aside the defendant's conviction and sentence.
State v. DePew518 shares many similarities with Griffin. DePew exercised his
statutory right to make an unswom statement and indicated in his statement that
he did not have a criminal record prior to the present charges. 519 In response at
closing, the prosecutor told the jury that if DePew had testified he would have
asked him if he had been subsequently convicted of any offenses.520 Although the
court recognized that extensive commentary on the nature of the defendant's
unswom statement affected both his statutory right to make such a statement and
his Fifth Amendment rights, it refused to completely preclude the prosecutor from
making any comment to avoid being unfair to the State.52' The result was a
compromise: the court permitted the prosecutor to comment on the unsworn
nature of the defendant's statement, but required that such commentary be limited
to stating that the defendant's statement was not made under oath or affirmation
... See supra Part II.B.8.
114 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
"' See id. at 611,615.
516 Id. at 614.
517 See id.
"' 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1988).
519 Id. at 553.520 See id.
521 Id. at 554. But see Lorraine v. Coyle, No. 4:96 CV 0801, slip op. at 92-93 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 30, 2001) (granting petitioner relief from a death sentence in part because of the




The DePew decision has several problems. First, there is no room for
compromise in Griffin; its prohibition is absolute. There is to be no penalty
imposed on a criminal defendant for exercising his or her rights.523 Second,
prosecutors often refuse to limit their commentary to the confines of DePew.
24
At the trial level, there are several steps that the defense practitioner can take
to protect the defendant's statutory right to make an unswom statement. By
motion, the defense practitioner should request that the prosecutor be precluded
from commenting on the unsworn nature of the defendant's statement. Indeed,
Griffin's language is absolute, despite the Supreme Court of Ohio's deviation
from it. If the trial court denies the motion, the practitioner should object to any
commentary made by the prosecutor that exceeds the strict confines of DePew.
Two capital appellants have had success on this issue in federal court, and it is
vital that defense practitioners continue to raise it.
525
Unfortunately, the problems that can result when the defendant exercises his
or her right to make an unswom statement are not limited to comment on the
unswom nature of the statement. Beyond being able to tell the jury that the
defendant was not under oath when he or she spoke, the prosecutor also has an
extensive right to rebut the information presented in the defendant's unswom
statement. Prosecutors may present evidence that rebuts any false or incomplete
mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. 26 On the surface, the
presentation of rebuttal evidence appears reasonable enough, but the Supreme
Court of Ohio stretched the right of rebuttal too far in State v. Jalowiec.
5 27
In Jalowiec, the defendant made an unswom statement in which he discussed
his arthritis, its effects on him, and his positive relationship with his girlfriend and
her children.528 The defendant indicated that he did not have a drug problem and
that there were no criminal cases pending against him.529 Jalowiec resumed the
stand and presented additional information after the trial court ruled that his
statement demonstrated that he was a "great guy," which permitted the prosecutor
522 Id. Subsequently, DePew received relief in federal court based on prosecutor
misconduct committed during the penalty phase of his trial, including a comment on his
unswom statement. See DePew v. Anderson, 104 F. Supp. 2d 879, 885 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
523 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,614 (1965).
524 Even in DePew, the prosecutor's comments exceeded the scope of permissible
commentary. See DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 554.525 See Lorraine, No. 4:96 CV 0801, at 92-93; DePew, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
116 See State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 887 (Ohio 1998).
527 744 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 2001).
128 Id. at 176.
529 Id.
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to rebut that trait, even with evidence of prior violent crimes.53 ° In rebuttal, the
prosecution presented seven witnesses who testified that Jalowiec sold and used
drugs.53' The prosecution also presented extensive testimony about an alleged
felonious assault and arson. 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the trial
court that Jalowiec's very limited statement opened the door for the prosecution's
entire rebuttal.533
In dissent, Justice Stratton agreed that Jalowiec opened the door to the
rebuttal drug evidence.534 However, Justice Stratton rejected the court's opinion
that Jalowiec opened the door to the testimony respecting the felonious assault
and arson charges, as this evidence did not rebut the issues raised in his unswom
53
statement. 3 Justice Stratton saw the prosecution's actions for what they were: a
"blatant attempt to discredit a person who.., was without a criminal record.
536
The real fear emanating from Jalowiec is that the decision has put the defendant
in a position where "almost any positive comment a defendant could make about
himself or herself would open the door to every possible or even speculative
misdeed he or she ever committed or was even alleged to have committed."
537
On the surface Jalowiec appears to give the prosecutor an unlimited right to
rebuttal. Jalowiec, however, did not overrule DePew. Thus, it is still the law in
Ohio that the prosecutor may only rebut materiallyfalse or incomplete mitigation
evidence.538 What was significant about Jalowiec was that the defendant took the
stand and lied.539 Moreover, the false evidence that the defendant presented
related to evidence of "good character," which is a very broad mitigating factor.
Apparently, the court would not have permitted such an extensive rebuttal but for
the fact that the defendant presented false evidence of good character.
For an example of DePew's application after Jalowiec, assume a capital
defendant is convicted of committing aggravated murder along with the
section 2929.04(A)(7) specification that the murder was committed while the
offender was committing rape. The defendant has no significant criminal history
and intends to present as mitigating evidence his lack of a criminal record
530 id.
53 Id. at 184-85.
532 Id.




138 DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 554-55.539 See Jones, 744 N.E.2d at 177.
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pursuant to section 2929.04(B)(5).140 In this circumstance, the prosecutor could
not properly rebut the section 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor with evidence of
uncharged sex crimes allegedly committed by the defendant. It would be
impermissible under DePew for the prosecutor to rebut the defendant's
section 2929.04(B)(5) mitigating evidence with evidence of this allegation, as
such a mitigating factor is based on a lack of prior convictions.54 1
We believe preparation is the key at trial to controlling the prosecution's
rebuttal. The defendant must prepare his or her unswom statement in advance.
The defense practitioner must make sure that the defendant does not open the
door to damaging information on rebuttal. The defense practitioner must also
ensure that the defendant's unswom statement is accurate to avoid any attempt by
the prosecution to engage in Jalowiec's wide-ranging rebuttal. Additionally, we
suggest filing a motion in limine to determine the admissibility of the prosecutor's
rebuttal evidence before it is put before the jury. The defense practitioner will be
better prepared to make strategic decisions respecting the presentation of
mitigation evidence with advance knowledge of what the trial court will permit
the prosecutor to do.
7. Upon Appellate Reversal of the Defendant's Death Sentence and
Remand to the Trial Court for Resentencing, the Defendant
Cannot Present Additional Mitigation Evidence
In State v. Davis, 42 the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a defendant's death
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing as a result of errors that occurred
"after all available mitigating evidence had been heard. 5 43 At resentencing, the
defendant offered additional mitigation relying on Lockett v. Ohio 44 and Skipper
v. South Carolina,545 which preclude the sentencer from refusing to consider any
54
relevant mitigation. 46 The trial court refused to consider Davis's mitigation, a
decision with which the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed.547
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the court noted that there was no
140 Section 2929.04(B)(5) provides that "[t]he offender's lack of a significant history of
prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications" shall be considered by the trier of
fact under certain circumstances. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(5) (West 1997).
141 See DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 554.
542 584 N.E.2d 1192 (Ohio 1992).
141 Id. at 1193 (citing State v. Davis, 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988)).
544 38 U.S. 586 (1978).
14' 476 U.S. (1986).
546 Davis, 584 N.E.2d at 1194.547 Id. at 1195.
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relevant evidence excluded during the mitigation hearing.148 Since the trial court
proceeds from the point of the error on remand,549 the supreme court reasoned
that the defendant's additional mitigating evidence should not have been
considered. In dissent, Justice Wright recognized that Lockett's directives do not
disappear at resentencing.550 The Federal Constitution requires more than simply
a technical rewrite of the trial court's sentencing opinion. Nevertheless, there was
a glimmer of hope in Davis. The court noted that its consideration of this issue
might have been different if the mitigation the defendant attempted to present at
resentencing was available, but not presented, at the time of the original
sentencing hearing.55'
Confronted squarely with the question it reserved in a footnote of Davis,52
the court extinguished that glimmer in State v. Chinn.5' Chinn's death sentence
was vacated and his case remanded to the trial court for errors that occurred after
the jury's sentencing recommendation. 4 Chinn attempted to present additional
mitigation, making the same arguments under Lockett and Skipper as in Davis.
Unlike Davis, however, the mitigation that Chinn attempted to present was
available, but not presented, at the time of his original mitigation hearing. 5
Without even a passing reference to the footnote in Davis, the court held that the
trial court appropriately refused to consider Chinn's mitigation; it made no
difference that the mitigation evidence could have been presented at the time of
Chinn's original sentencing hearing.556
We believe that Davis and Chinn are contrary to Lockett and Skipper. Thus,
the defense practitioner should proffer any new mitigation in reliance on Lockett
and Skipper on remand for resentencing. If the defendant is resentenced to death
and the trial court follows Davis, appellate counsel can raise this as a settled issue
under State v. Poindexter.55 7 As Justice Wright recognized in Davis, the sentencer
is required to consider all mitigation in a capital sentencing hearing.558
541 Id. at 1194-95.
549 Id.
550 Id. at 1199 (Wright, J., dissenting).
551 Id. at 1195 n.2.
552 Id.
... 709 N.E.2d 1166 (Ohio 1999).554 Id. at 1180.
5  Id. at 1181.
556 Id.
557 520 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1988).
... State v. Davis, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1199 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., dissenting).
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8. The Supreme Court of Ohio Places Too High a Burden on the
Defendant to Show Need Under Ake v. Oklahoma and State v. Mason
As previously discussed, 559 the Supreme Court of Ohio has broadly
interpreted Ake v. Oklahoma.560 The capital defendant in Ohio is entitled to expert
assistance in broad-ranging areas of expertise. 6 ' The high burden placed on the
defendant to show need, however, hinders the capital defendant's chances of
receiving the necessary expert assistance.
In State v. Campbell,5 62 the defendant requested that a chest CT be performed
based upon a medical report, which indicated that there was a mass on his lung
and that a "malignant process [could not] be excluded. 5 63 In reviewing this issue,
the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that cancer would be a mitigating
factor. 64 The court rejected Campbell's claim, however, because it found that he
had not presented anything to indicate that such evidence would aid his defense or
that his physical health would be a "critical issue" at sentencing.16' Review of
Campbell demonstrates that the court set an insurmountable burden for the capital
defendant to meet.
First, the evidence Campbell sought to develop would have been extremely
important for sentencing purposes. He attacked a sheriff's deputy, escaped from
jail, and then kidnapped and killed a young man. Given these facts, "counsel
could reasonably fear that future dangerousness would be on the jurors'
minds. 566 Evidence of cancer, which would demonstrate a shortened life
expectancy and deteriorating physical health, would have alleviated fears of
future dangerousness. Campbell's physical health was an essential component of
the mitigation defense that needed to be fully investigated.
Campbell's request for expert assistance was not a fishing expedition in
search of all conceivable, but unknown, mitigation. He presented the report of a
disinterested physician indicating that he might suffer from cancer based on the
presence of a mass on his lung. Absent additional medical testing, Campbell
could not determine if he suffered from cancer. To expect more from an indigent
lay person is unreasonable.
"9 See supra Part I.B.10.
560 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
161 See State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 943 (Ohio 1998) (citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).
562 738 N.E.2d 1178 (Ohio 2000).563 Id. at 1190.
564 Id. (citing State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373, 385 (Ohio 1989)). In Bradley, the court
considered the defendant's advanced age, which made it unlikely that he would be released
fromprison, as a mitigating factor. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d at 385.
65 Campbell, 738 N.E.2d at 1191.566 Id. at 1199. But see supra Part ll.B.4.
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Despite the high burden the Supreme Court of Ohio placed upon the
defendant in Campbell, the defense practitioner should continue to request, both
at the trial and sentencing phases, expert assistance that will aid the client.
Counsel must object to any denials of assistance and proffer what assistance is
needed, how it will aid the defense, and the prejudice that will result to the
defendant if such assistance is denied.
C. Jury Participation
1. A Defendant's Jury Waiver May Need Be
Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent
The valid waiver of a constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.567 Moreover, the act of waiver must be done with "sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. 5 68 For a
criminal defendant to waive a fundamental right, the defendant must be apprised
of the "relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of that waiver in order to
determine if such waiver is freely and intelligently made.
5 69
In State v. Jells,57 ° the Supreme Court of Ohio inexplicably failed to require
that a capital defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial be knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.571 The trial court's colloquy that was prior to accepting Jells's jury
waiver consisted of two questions. First, was Jells waiving his right to a jury of
his own free will?572 Second, had anyone forced Jells into waiving his right to a
jury?573 With both questions answered to the court's satisfaction and a signed jury
waiver, the trial court accepted the defendant's jury waiver.574 On appeal, Jells,
argued that the court's insufficient inquiry rendered his jury waiver insufficient. In
rejecting Jells's argument without even a passing reference to the Federal or Ohio
Constitutions, the Supreme Court of Ohio announced that it does not require that
the defendant be questioned to assess "whether he or she is fully apprised of the
167 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). But see Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding that waivers of Fourth Amendment rights need
only be voluntary).
568 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
569 id.
570 559 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio 1990).
571 See id. at 468 (declining to require a trial court to make an interrogation into whether
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right to a jury trial." 5 Jells holdsthat the waiver of the findamental right to a
jury trial can occur regardless of whether such a waiver is knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.
The Jells decision is plainly at odds with the requirements of the Federal
Constitution.5 76 However, the analysis employed by the court in State v. Baston
577
is in line with the requirements of the Federal Constitution. The court identified
the appropriate standard for assessing a valid waiver of a fundamental right. The
court then detailed the extensive colloquy that was conducted, which included
asking defense counsel if they discussed the differences between a jury trial and a
panel trial, explaining the right to a jury trial comprised of twelve persons, the
unanimity requirement, and the sentencing recommendation. sv The trial court
also informed Baston that if he waived that right, he would be tried before a panel
of three judges and that the panel had to be unanimous on any sentence it would
impose.579
We first want to emphasize that a jury should be waived only in the rarest of
circumstances. Although both the jury and the panel need to be unanimous in a
death penalty recommendation,'" the defense practitioner's odds at finding a
person to vote for life are better with a pool of twelve rather than three persons.
Beyond sheer numbers, proceeding with a panel limits the issues that can be
raised on appeal because judges are "presumed to have considered only relevant,
competent and admissible evidence in its deliberations."58 We believe this is a
false assumption," 2 as judges are only human and can be affected by prejudicial
conduct or evidence. Further, judges are elected officials and thus may be subject
to pressures that are not felt by the layperson who sits on a jury."'
In the wake of Jells and Baston, the requirements for a valid jury trial waiver
in Ohio are unclear. Although Jells is technically still good law, we believe the
court recognized in Baston that the Jells procedure does not pass constitutional
muster. Should a jury waiver be necessary, the defense practitioner must ensure
575 Id.
576ee Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
577 09 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1999).
578 Id. at 133.
579 id.
580 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03(D)(2), (3) (West 1997).
5 State v. Eley, 672 N.E.2d 640, 653 (Ohio 1996) (citing State v. Davis, 584 N.E.2d
1192, 1195 (1992)).
582 In State v. Allard, for example, the trial court sua sponte ordered and then considered a
presentence investigation report (PSI) when it sentenced Allard to death, despite the fact that
section 2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code provides for a PSI only at the defendant's
request. 663 N.E.2d 1277, 1284 (Ohio 1996).
583 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 519 n.5 (citation omitted).
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that this fundamental right is not waived unless the defendant makes a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary decision to do so.
2. Capital Juries Do Not Have To Be Both Life and Death
Qualified by the Trial Court at Voir Dire
In Ohio, the ultimate responsibility is on the trial court to
"examine... prospective jurors... as to their qualifications to serve as fair and
impartial jurors. 58 4 In State v. Stojetz,585 the appellant argued that the trial court's
conduct at voir dire failed to satisfy such a requirement and violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The trial court sua sponte death-qualified
all prospective jurors. Stojetz argued on appeal that this action then required the
court to sua sponte life-qualify all prospective jurors as well. 86 Relying on
Morgan v. Illinois,587 the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Stojetz's arguments.
Morgan requires such inquiry only when the defense requests it-a request
Stojetz's trial counsel did not make. 88 Additionally, the court noted that the voir
dire of the two jurors that served without being life-qualified demonstrated that
they were not automatic death penalty jurors.589
The defense practitioner should request that the trial court life-qualify the jury
at voir dire pursuant to Morgan. If the trial court refuses this request, counsel
should object. Additionally, the supreme court's opinion failed to address
Stojetz's Due Process and Equal Protection Clause challenges. Thus, we urge
defense practitioners to continue to raise these arguments. First, the Due Process
Clause does not permit state court proceedings that provide an unfair advantage to
the prosecution.59° Both the accused and the accuser are entitled to justice.591
Consequently, there must be an equitable balance maintained between the State
and the defendant.592 Due process also requires that state-created procedures be
584 Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.27 (West 1997).
585 705 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio 1999).
586 Id. at 335.
587 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
188 Stojetz, 705 N.E.2d at 335-36 (citing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-734); State v. Allard,
663 N.E.2d 1277, 1288 (Ohio 1996).589 Stojetz, 705 N.E.2d at 336.
590 See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973) (concluding that the State must
reciprocate the defendant's obligation to provide discovery); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
22 (1967) (noting that the defendant must have the same capability to present witnesses as the
State); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (stating that a defendant charged with
a serious offense must be represented by counsel).
591 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
592 Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475.
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administered in a meaningful manner. 5 3 We believe a strong due process
argument can be made that, when the trial court sua sponte ensures that a juror
can be fair to the prosecution by ensuring that the juror can impose the death
penalty, such action obligates the trial court to similarly ensure that the juror can
be fair to the defendant by assuring that the juror can also impose a life sentence.
Second, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits state action that impinges on
fundamental rights 94 and is violated when seemingly neutral legislation is applied
in an unequal and oppressive manner.5 95 Section 2945.27 of the Ohio Revised
Code places upon the trial court the obligation to examine prospective jurors for
fairness and impartiality. 96 In the capital context, an impartial and indifferent
juror is a juror capable of considering both life and death sentencing options.5 97
By only questioning jurors with respect to their ability to impose the death
penalty, the trial court unequally applies neutral legislation in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. In Harris v. Alabama,598 the United States Supreme
Court noted that the appellant failed to raise an equal protection claim in his
arguments respecting the state courts' failure to treat advisory verdicts
uniformly. 599 Thus, a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause could ripen in
the proper case.
3. A Capital Defendant Need Not Be Permitted to Question
the Jury During Voir Dire on Specific Mitigating Factors
An adequate voir dire assists in assuring the criminal defendant's right to an
impartial jury.60 Its function is critical in that regard. 60 1 Although the Federal
Constitution might not "dictate a catechism for voir dire," the opportunity
afforded must permit the defendant to "identify unqualified j urors.' 602
For capital trial counsel, the goal at voir dire is often two-fold. First, counsel
seeks jurors who will hold the prosecution to its burden of proving the
'9' See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985).
594 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
595 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.27 (West 1997).
197 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 435
(1985).
598 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
599 Id. at 515.
600 See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729.
601 Id
602 Id.; see Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950); Morford v. United
States, 339 U.S. 258, 259 (1950).
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defendant's guilt on every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 6°3
Second, counsel seeks jurors who are willing to consider the mitigating evidence
and who are capable of imposing a life sentence. Nevertheless, "weighing
aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors is a complex process."' 4
Discovering jurors that meet the second criteria can thus be quite difficult,
particularly if the court limits counsel's inquiry into the jurors' capacity to
consider potential mitigating factors. Specifically, if the court precludes counsel
from explaining mitigation and potential mitigating factors, jurors cannot
accurately indicate if they can properly weigh and consider that evidence during
the mitigation phase.
In State v. Lundgren, °5 for example, counsel sought to question prospective
jurors as to whether they "would consider and give weight" to the statutorily
mandated mitigating factors. 606 The court did not permit this line of questioning,
but permitted counsel to ask in general if the prospective jurors "would consider
mitigating factors and evidence as instructed. '" 7 We believe it was correct for the
court to preclude counsel from asking the jurors if they could "give weight" to a
mitigating factor, which asks the jury to prejudge an issue and is a different
inquiry from whether to "consider and weigh" mitigation. However, the question
permitted by the trial court failed to give counsel any indication as to whether a
prospective juror would consider and weigh the mitigating factors relevant to the
defendant.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's unfair restrictions on
voir dire prevented him from discovering biased jurors and effectively exercising
peremptory challenges.6 °8 The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the challenge,
relying on the discretion afforded to trial courts at voir dire.609 Further, the court
indicated that a juror could not respond to the questions counsel sought to ask,
which was whether the juror could consider and weigh a specific mitigating factor
without hearing all of the evidence and receiving instructions of law.
610
Moreover, evidence relating to the defendant's history, character, and background
"need be given little or no weight against the aggravating circumstances" if the
611jury does not find such evidence to be mitigating.
603 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
604 State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304, 315 (Ohio 1995).
60' 653 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1995).
606 Id. at 314.
607 Id.
608 See id. at 315.
609 Id.; see State v. Bedford, 529 N.E.2d 274, 285 (Ohio 1988); Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 194 (1981).6 1 0 id.
61/d. (quoting State v. Stumpf, 512 N.E.2d 598, 605 (Ohio 1987)).
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The court found additional support for its Lundgren decision when it rejected
the appellant's arguments in State v. Wilson.6 12 Wilson argued that the trial court's
refusal to allow him to individually question prospective jurors with regard to
their ability to consider the statutory mitigating factors, as well as fourteen
additional non-statutory mitigating factors, denied him due process.613 Citing to
Mu 'Min v. Virginia,614 the court noted that trial courts are to be given "great
latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire."615 If the United
States Supreme Court saw no reason to require that a trial court individually
question jurors during voir dire on the content of exposure to pretrial publicity, 616
then certainly the Constitution did not require Ohio trial courts to conduct voir
dire on specific mitigating factors.
Thus, there is no obligation on Ohio trial courts to permit counsel to question
jurors during voir dire on specific mitigating factors. However, the court failed to
address whether the issue would be resolved differently if it became apparent that
general questions completely confused prospective jurors about their
consideration of mitigating factors and evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio
answered in the negative in State v. Jones.6 17 Regardless of juror confusion, trial
courts are not obligated to discuss, or to permit counsel to discuss, specific
mitigating factors during voir dire.618
Lundgren, Wilson, and Jones do not foreclose voir dire on individual
mitigating factors at trial. Although the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to require
trial courts to include such questioning during voir dire,619 the court did not
preclude the inquiry. As a result, the defense practitioner may request such
questioning at his or her discretion.62°
A strong point in the defendant's favor is that the prosecution will often
spend a significant amount of time during voir dire discussing aggravating
circumstances. The Due Process Clause does not permit state court proceedings
that provide an unfair advantage to the prosecution.621 Moreover, the Equal
612 659 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1996).
613 Id. at 300.
614 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
615 Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 300 (citing Mu Min, 500 U.S. at 424).
616 id.
617 44 N.E.2d 1163 (Ohio 2001).6181 Id. at 1171.619 See id.
610 See Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ohio 1996); State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304, 315
(Ohio 1995).
621 See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973) (concluding that the State must
reciprocate the defendant's obligation to provide discovery); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
23 (1967) (noting that the defendant must have the same capability to present witnesses as the
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Protection Clause prohibits the application of neutral legislation in an unequal and
oppressive manner.62 2 Thus, to permit the prosecution to ensure that jurors are
willing to consider and weigh case-specific aggravating circumstances while
denying the defendant the same opportunity is to deny the defendant his rights to
due process and equal protection.
If the court will not permit questioning on mitigating factors, the defense
practitioner should let the jurors indicate what mitigation they will consider. For
example, rather than asking the jurors if they will consider and weigh the
defendant's alcohol dependence at sentencing, the defense practitioner should ask
the jurors what information they believe would be important to know about the
defendant and his or her life before the jury decides what sentence is appropriate.
This will give insight into how the jurors will weigh and consider mitigating
evidence. There is an added benefit to this type of open-ended questioning. It is
not unusual for a juror to respond that he or she would want to know if the killing
was the result of self-defense. Of course, the defendant's case would not proceed
to the mitigation phase if the jury determined that he or she acted in self-defense.
Thus, this reply provides an opportunity to explain what is not mitigation.
Additionally, if the only mitigating evidence a prospective juror will consider is a
complete defense to the crime, then the juror is an automatic death penalty juror
that should be removed for cause.623
Finally, the defense practitioner should be alert to any confusion among
prospective jurors. If the questions posed only serve to leave the jurors befuddled
as to what their task will be at the mitigation phase, then the defense practitioner
should make efforts to clarify the issues. If the court precludes such clarification,
counsel should ensure that the record is clear that the juror is confused and that
the court will not permit clarification of the issues for the juror.
State); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (stating that a defendant charged with
a serious offense must be represented by counsel).
622 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). The relevant legislation is found in
section 2945.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides that "[t]he judge of the trial court
shall examine the prospective jurors under oath or upon affirmation as to their qualifications to
serve as fair and impartial jurors, but he shall permit reasonable examination of such jurors by
the prosecuting attorney and by the defendant or his counsel." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.27
(West 1997).
611 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,729 (1992).
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4. The Supreme Court of Ohio Does Not Require
Courts to Adhere to Section 2945.25
As previously discussed,624 section 2945.25 of the Ohio Revised Code
provides a benefit to the defendant during jury selection by making it more
difficult to remove a death-scrupled juror than under the Wainwright v. Witt625
standard. However, capital defendants do not receive the benefit of
section 2945.25. Ignoring this section, the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly
applied the less cumbersome Witt standard. 626 In State v. Treesh,627 the court
identified section 2945.25 as the correct standard to evaluate the removal of a
juror. Several months later, however, the court reverted back to Witt as the
appropriate standard for reviewing errors arising from jurors' opinions on the
death penalty.
628
Once a state confers "procedural protections of liberty interests that extend
beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United States," the
Constitution's minimal requirements are no longer controlling.629 The defense
practitioner must ensure that jurors are excused only if they satisfy the criteria
found in section 2945.25. Additionally, a capital defendant has a liberty interest in
the proper application of a state's capital sentencing scheme,63° which is protected
by the Due Process Clause. Thus, the defense practitioner should assert any
deviation from the statutory mandate as a due process violation.
D. Appellate Review
1. Proportionality Review in Ohio Is Meaningless
As a traditional concept, "proportionality" review is an "abstract evaluation
of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime."6 3' In the death penalty
context, the proportionality inquiry is slightly different. Such review assumes that
624 See supra Part Il.C.2.
621 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
626 See State v. Stallings, 731 N.E.2d 159, 169 (Ohio 2000); State v. White, 709 N.E.2d
140, 149 (Ohio 1999); State v. McNeill, 700 N.E.2d 596, 605 (Ohio 1998); State v. Williams,
679 N.E.2d 646, 653 (Ohio 1997); State v. Rogers, 478 N.E.2d 984, 990 (Ohio 1985).
627 739 N.E.2d 749 (Ohio 2001).
621 State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1171 (Ohio 2000).
629 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).630 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985); see also Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d
1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1993).
631 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984).
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the death penalty "is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense."63 2
Rather, the review asks whether death is unacceptable in a given case because it is
"disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same
crime., 63 3 Numerous states provide for such review, including Ohio; however,
such review is not required by either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution.634
Incorporation of proportionality review into capital sentencing schemes arose
as a response to the arbitrariness found by the United States Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia.635 There was "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which [death was] imposed from the many cases in which it [was]
not.' 636 Ohio provides for proportionality review pursuant to section 2929.05(A)
of the Ohio Revised Code, which states that the reviewing court must assess
"whether the sentence [of death] is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases.'637
The Supreme Court of Ohio set out the requirements of Ohio's
proportionality review in State v. Steffen.638 The court used Steffen as a vehicle to
limit proportionality review to only the reviewing court's own cases in which
death was imposed.639 This can be particularly detrimental to the capital
defendant whose case is reviewed by the court of appeals because many of those
courts have reviewed only a minute number of capital cases and, therefore, the
comparison universe is virtually nonexistent.
Beyond the limited universe of cases considered, the court has further
weakened its statutorily mandated proportionality review. The court has reduced
its review to the simple identification of other death penalty cases where the same
aggravating circumstances were present and the statement that death in the
present case was not disproportionate. Consequently, Steffen ensures that there is
no meaningful proportionality review in Ohio.
Ohio is one of only four states that limit proportionality review to a universe
of cases in which death was imposed. 640 The Supreme Court of Ohio selected this
632 Id. at 43.
633 Id.
634 Id. at 44.
635 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972); see Steven M. Sprenger, A Critical Evaluation of State
Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOwA L. REv. 719, 722-
23 (1988).
616Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 908-09 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
637 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (West 1997).
6" 509 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio 1987).
639 See id. at 395.
640 See Sprenger, supra note 635, at 731.
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as the appropriate universe for two express reasons. First, only death penalty cases
are considered because they are "qualitatively different" from other cases and,
consequently, any comparison of other cases would be useless.641 Second, review
is limited to only those cases passed upon by the reviewing court because a court
lacks familiarity with the circumstances of cases that it has not previously
reviewed. 42
The court's reasoning, however, is not logical. First, the plain language of the
Ohio Revised Code suggests that the General Assembly intended a much larger
pool for comparison. Pursuant to section 2929.03(F) of the Revised Code, the trial
court must draft an opinion when sentencing the capital defendant to a life
sentence.i Thus, the General Assembly must have included this requirement for
the sole reason of ensuring a comparison to other cases.
Second, a capital aggravated murder case is not qualitatively different from
every other aggravated murder case. The crime of aggravated murder is the
same.644 Moreover, the facts and circumstances can be very similar.645 This would
be markedly true for the capital aggravated murder conviction in which the
defendant is sentenced to life rather than death.
Third, reviewing courts can easily achieve the necessary familiarity with
similar cases. There is no need to limit review to only those death penalty cases
that the appellate court has previously evaluated. Law clerks, paralegals, staff
attorneys, master commissioners, computer assistants, and court administrators
"can eliminate the need to unduly limit the comparison pool.' '646
The restrictive interpretation of section 2929.05(A) excludes many
aggravated murder cases that are both similar and relevant to the proportionality
of the capital defendant's sentence. The review required by the court fails to
answer the real question that proportionality review is meant to answer. In Ohio,
we do not know if the "case under review [can] be meaningfully distinguished
64' See State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 395 (Ohio 1987).
642 Id.
64' Section 2929.03(F) of the Ohio Revised Code, in pertinent part, provides:
The court or panel, when it imposes life imprisonment under division (D) of this section,
shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating factors set
forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code it found to exist, what other
mitigating factors it found to exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found
guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these aggravating circumstances were
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(F) (West 1997).
644 See Sprenger, supra note 635, at 731.
645 id.
646 Id. at 732.
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from the many similar cases that resulted in sentences less than death." 7
If there were any doubt that the proportionality review in Ohio is
meaningless, the actual practice of review in the Supreme Court of Ohio removes
it. The court often reviews proportionality by rote. Cases in which death was
previously imposed are simply cited as support for the court's finding that death is
neither excessive nor disproportionate. There is no real comparison of facts,
circumstances, aggravating circumstances, or mitigating factors.
Some more notable examples include State v. Goodwin,648 State v. Stojetz,64'
State v. Benge,650 and State v. Spivey.61 In Goodwin, the defendant was convicted
of two counts of aggravated murder for a single homicide.652 Goodwin's
indictment included the lone aggravating circumstance of aggravated robbery.653
Included among the cases deemed "similar" by the Supreme Court of Ohio was
State v. Clemons,6" in which the defendant killed three people and was sentenced
to death based on an entirely different aggravating circumstance; 655 State v.
Palmer,6 in which the defendant killed two people and was sentenced to death
based on the felony murder aggravating circumstance present in Goodwin, but
also on the two additional circumstances of prior murder and murder to escape
detection; 657 and State v. Wilson,658 in which the defendant was sentenced to
death based on the presence of three aggravating circumstances, including murder
to escape detection, murder during a kidnapping, and murder during arson-none
of which were present in Goodwin.659 Indeed, except for the fact that all four men
were sentenced to death in Ohio, the similarities between these cases are
nonexistent.
In Stojetz, the court's proportionality review was equally superficial. Stojetz
was convicted of killing an inmate while incarcerated in an Ohio prison.660 Stojetz
faced one aggravating circumstance of murdering while a prisoner.66 ! At
mitigation, evidence was presented that Stojetz did not have a history of violent
647Id. (footnote omitted).
68 703 N.E.2d 1251 (Ohio 1999).
649 705 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio 1999).
00 661 N.E.2d 1019 (Ohio 1996).
61 692 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1998).652 703 N.E.2d at 1256.
653 Id. at 1255.
654 696 N.E.2d 1009 (Ohio 1998).
655 See id. at 1009.
616 687 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1997).
657 See id. at 685.
6" 659 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1996).659 See id. at 292.
660 Stojetz, 705 N.E.2d at 334.
661 id.
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offenses, that he had a troubled childhood, that he suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder and a paranoid schizoid personality, that the victim threatened
Stojetz, and that he felt remorse and sorrow.662 The court cited State v. Carte663
as a "similar" case despite the fact that Carter faced an additional aggravating
circumstance for having committed a prior murder and the fact that Carter failed
to present any mitigation beyond his own unswom statement.664 The court also
cited State v. Zuern6 65 despite the fact that Zuem killed a law enforcement agent
and faced two additional aggravating circumstances for killing a peace officer.
666
Moreover, Zuem provided almost no mitigating factors at his sentencing
hearing.667 Thus, the only similarity between Stojetz, Zuern, and Carter is that the
killings occurred in a penal institution. Indeed, any capital defendant should
receive more review of the facts and circumstances than that which is currently
performed by the court pursuant to its proportionality review.
In Benge, moreover, the appellant identified and discussed twenty-three
aggravated murder cases that were "similar" to the crime committed.668 Utilizing
the Bills of Particulars, Benge argued that his sentence of death was
disproportionate to the sentences in other "similar" cases. 669 Benge was charged
and convicted of aggravated murder for killing his girlfriend and of the
aggravating circumstance of aggravated robbery for stealing her ATM card.67 °
Evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Benge and the victim shared the
ATM card and, more generally, their money.67' Moreover, the victim had
jewelry, a checkbook, and cash still in her possession when her body was
found.672 Thus, there was weak evidence of the aggravating circumstance.
Additionally, Benge presented considerable mitigation, including the fact that he
lacked a significant criminal history, he had a troubled family background, he was
a loving father, he was a hard-worker, and his violent act was out of character.
673
Benge also informed the court that his case was not originally capitally
662 Id. at 344-45.
663 594 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1992).
6 Id. at 602.
665 512 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio 1987).
666Id. at 587.
667 Id. at 595-96.
68 See Merit Brief of Appellant at 53-59, State v. Benge, 661 N.E.2d 1019 (Ohio 1996)
(No. 95-0112).
669 See id.
670 Benge, 661 N.E.2d at 1023-24.
671 Id. at 1029.
672 Id. at 1022.
673 Id. at 1029.
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indicted.674
Benge then compared the facts in his case to numerous aggravated murders
prosecuted in Butler County that did not result in a death sentence.675 In State v.
Moore,676 for example, the defendant married the victim and convinced her to sell
her mobile home for $12,000.677 He then shot her in the head while she slept and
absconded with her money.678 In State v. Mdntosh,679 the defendant was
convicted of strangling his girlfriend. In a death penalty case involving Bradford
Gill, the defendant raped and killed a young girl and then assisted in the search
and communicated with the family about the missing child.68° In State v.
Fryman,68 l the defendant lured the victim to his home, shot her in the head, and
then mutilated her body on a satanic altar.68 2 Each of these men received a life
sentence for their crimes while Benge received death. Indeed, there was a
meaningful basis to distinguish Benge's case from these other "similar" crimes:
Benge's crime was far less heinous, and yet he was sentenced to death.
Nevertheless, the court failed to address Benge's arguments when it assessed
proportionality.683
Spivey ma be the most telling example of the Supreme Court of Ohio's
perfunctory proportionality analysis. Without citation to a single case and without
even a half-hearted semblance of comparison, the court simply proclaimed that it
had undertaken a review of proportionality and determined that Spivey's sentence
of death was not excessive or disproportionate.68 As Spivey, Benge, Goodwin,
and Stojetz demonstrate, the statutorily mandated proportionality review has
become a meaningless endeavor.
Section 2929.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code directs the sentencer to
compare the penalty to "similar cases." We believe this pool should logically
include all aggravated murders consisting of, at a minimum, those cases in which
the defendant received a life sentence. On appeal, the defense practitioner should
include in his or her arguments on proportionality a discussion of any similar
cases in which the defendant did not receive death. Absent such comparison,
674 See Merit Brief of Appellant at 58, 87, State v. Benge, 661 N.E.2d 1019 (Ohio 1996)
(No. 95-0112).675 See id. at 57-59.
67' No. CA 85-04-035, 1986 WL 12097 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1986).
677 Id. at * 1.
678 Id.679 No. CA87-02-027, 1987 WL 18840, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1987).
680 See Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, No. CA85-08-085, 1986 WL 4233, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 1986).
68 No. CA87-10-125, 1988 WL 141683 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1988).
682 Id. at *2.
683 661 N.E.2d at 1029.
614 State v. Spivey, 692 N.E.2d 151, 170 (Ohio 1998).
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courts cannot truly assess whether death is proportionate in the defendant's case.
Additionally, counsel should include a constitutional challenge to the statute, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Ohio and applied in the defendant's case,
because the defendant has a due process liberty interest in the proper application
of a state's capital sentencing scheme.
685
Appellate counsel can be greatly aided in their efforts respecting
proportionality review by trial counsel. Trial counsel should present or proffer
expert testimony with respect to the proportionality of the death penalty in the
defendant's case. Counsel should attempt to call the defendant's co-defendants or
co-conspirators as witnesses during the mitigation phase if they were not
sentenced to death. This is legitimate mitigating evidence that can be used to
make a proportionality argument.686
Attacking the proportionality of the defendant's sentence and the manner in
which the Supreme Court of Ohio will conduct that review is not a fruitless
endeavor. Ohio is one of only four states to limit its universe of cases to only
those cases in which the death penalty was imposed. Moreover, Ohio further
limits the universe by directing the reviewing court to consider only those cases it
has previously reviewed, which can create a very limited pool for comparison at
the court of appeals level because some counties impose an extremely small
number of death sentences. These restrictions are illogical, particularly when
consideration is given to section 2929.03(F) of the Ohio Revised Code.687
Requiring the trial court to write an opinion when it imposes a life sentence
strongly suggests that such data is to be considered during the appellate
proportionality review. The principal theme of Justice Pfeifer's dissent in State v.
Murphy688 was his disagreement with the present manner in which the Supreme
Court of Ohio conducts its proportionality review. To that end, Justice Pfeifer
stated that "[w]hen we compare a case in which the death penalty was imposed
611 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1998); Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1299
(9th Cir. 1993).
686 See State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 892 (Ohio 1998) ("In Parker v. Dugger, the United
States Supreme Court implicitly recognized that co-defendant's sentence could be considered a
non-statutory mitigating factor.") (citation omitted)).
687 Section 2929.03(F) of the Ohio Revised Code, in pertinent part, provides:
The court or panel, when it imposes life imprisonment under division (D) of this section,
shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating factors set
forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code it found to exist, what other
mitigating factors it found to exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found
guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these aggravating circumstances were
sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(F) (West 1997).
... 747 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 2001).
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only to other cases in which the death penalty was imposed, we continually lower
the bar of proportionality. The lowest common denominator becomes the
standard."
689
2. Appellate Reweighing Is Used as a Cure-All for Penalty Phase Error
In Clemons v. Mississippi,69° the United States Supreme Court held that a
state appellate court may use harmless error analysis or reweighing to correct
constitutional error that results when the capital sentencer relies on an invalid
aggravating circumstance. One of the two aggravating circumstances considered
by the jury in Clemons at sentencing was held to be invalid, but rather than
vacating his death sentence, the state court independently reweighed the evidence
and affirmed the death sentence. 69 ' The question before the Court was simply
whether an appellate court can reweigh the aggravating circumstances and
mitigating factors when one aggravating circumstance had been invalidated. The
Court approved the use of appellate reweighing where one of multiple
aggravating circumstances was invalidated.
Several years ago in State v. Davis,692 the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to
use appellate independent review as a "cure all.'6 93 Because the three-judge panel
that sentenced Davis considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances, the
court could not know if, after considering the proper factors, the panel would
arrive at the same sentence.694 Since Davis, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has used appellate reweighing, or independent review, to cure numerous errors.
Independent review, according to the court, can cure everything from
instructional errors to the exclusion of mitigating evidence.695 In fact, the Jones
689 Id. at 813 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
690 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
691 Id. at 747.
692 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988).
693 Id. at 936.
694 Id.
695 See e.g., State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1176 (Ohio 1999) (consideration of
duplicative aggravating circumstances); State v. Sheppard, 703 N.E.2d 286, 295 (Ohio 1998)
(prosecutor misconduct); State v. Reynolds, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1373 (Ohio 1998) (trial court
opinion failed to properly articulate why the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
factors); State v. Davie, 686 N.E.2d 245, 263 (Ohio 1997) (prosecutor misconduct); State v.
Dennis, 683 N.E.2d 1096, 1108 (Ohio 1997) (trial court determined sentence before allocution
& counsel's statements); State v. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d 960, 970 (Ohio 1996) (failure to instruct
jury); State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 308 (Ohio 1996) (jury instruction that limited
consideration of mitigation); State v. Lundgren, 653 N.E.2d 304, 323 (Ohio 1995) ("any
instructional defect"); State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895, 916 (Ohio 1989) (double count
aggravating circumstances).
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court held that it can cure any sentencing phase error with its independent
616
review.
However, such far-reaching use of appellate reweighing to cure error is
improper. Instructional errors, for example, cannot be reweighed. Rather, Boyde
v. California697 requires that the appellate court address "whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way
that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.' 69 Further,
Clemons does not authorize a state appellate court to reweigh the constitutional
error that results under Lockett and its progeny when mitigation is excluded from
the sentencer's consideration.699 The Supreme Court of Ohio has taken its
independent review well beyond the parameters of Clemons.
Contrary to the court's assertions, we do not believe that its independent
review can "cure" every sentencing phase error. Clemons only spoke to
reweighing after one aggravating circumstance was invalidated. The defense
practitioner must confront the overuse of appellate reweighing head-on. Only if
the court reweighs an invalid aggravating circumstance should this process go
unaddressed. The defense practitioner should identify to the court those
sentencing phase errors that cannot be reweighed. Counsel should include
arguments that capital sentencing proceedings are subject to the Due Process
Clause.7° Counsel should also identify the client's liberty interest in having both
the jury and the judge make findings of fact relative to the appropriate sentence.70 1
If the court proceeds to reweigh an error that should not be reweighed, the defense
practitioner should object to this in a motion to reconsider.
3. The Court Inconsistently Applies Retroactivity Rules
In State v. Cowans, °2 the defendant argued that the Supreme Court of Ohio
should vacate his death sentence because the trial court did not comply with the
procedural requirements for the waiver of mitigation set out by the court in State
696 State v. Jones, 739 N.E.2d 301, 317 (Ohio 2000) (citing State v. Cook, 605 N.E.2d 70,
82 (Ohio 1992)) ("Moreover, merger of the death sentences as part of our independent
assessment can readily cure any error that taints the jury's sentencing verdict.").
697 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
698 Id. at 380.
9See Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that there is no
reweighing where jury was precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence pursuant
to Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 9(1986)).
70Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747 (1990) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
701 Id. (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980)).
702 717 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1999).
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v. Ashworth.7 °3 The court, however, rejected Cowans's arguments and announced
that the procedural requirements of Ashworth were only to be applied
prospectively.70 Thus, Cowans would not receive the benefit of those procedural
rules.
The court's decision broke with constitutional precedent. Generally, "new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced. 7 °s Thus, a
criminal defendant should receive the benefit of any procedural change that
occurs prior to his or her conviction becoming final. The definition of "final" is
significant for Cowans. A conviction is not final until a defendant is convicted, he
or she exhausts his or her direct appeal, and the time for requesting a petition for
certiorari has passed.70 6 Although Cowans's trial occurred prior to the Ashworth
decision, Cowans's appeal was pending at the time Ashworth was decided. As a
result, Cowans's conviction was not final and he should have received the benefit
of Ashworth's procedural changes.707
When a change in law inures to the capital defendant's detriment, however,
the Supreme Court of Ohio has not hesitated to retroactively apply that change. In
State v. McGuire, °8 for example, the court removed residual doubt as a non-
statutory mitigating factor under Ohio law.709 Subsequently, the court has
repeatedly held that McGuire is to be retroactively applied, despite the fact that
residual doubt was a valid mitigating factor at the time the defendants were
convicted and sentenced.710
Thus far we have suggested ways to address the retroactive application of
McGuire.71' Although changes made by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) question the continued vitality of Teague v. Lane,712 the
Teague maxim that issues decided while a defendant's appeal is pending apply to
703 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1243 (Ohio 1999).
'04 Cowans, 717 N.E.2d at 314.
705 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
706 Id. at 295.
707 Id. at 310.
70' 686 N.E.2d 1124 (Ohio 1997).
709Id. at 1123.710 See State v. Treesh, 739 N.E.2d 749, 781 (Ohio 2001); State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645,
657 (Ohio 2000); State v. Bey, 709 N.E.2d 484, 503 (Ohio 1999).
71'See supra Part IV.B.1.
712 489 U.S. 288 (1989). As a result of the AEDPA, relief will be granted via federal
habeas corpus only where (1) the decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States" or (2) the decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(dXl)-(2)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
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his or her case on appeal remains a well-recognized principle of appellate
practice. The defense practitioner should always argue that the defendant should
receive the benefit of a change in the law that occurs during the pendency of his
or her appeal.
E. Collateral Review
1. Ohio's Post-Conviction Process Is Futile
In Case v. Nebraska,713 Justice Brennan described the essentials of a state
post-conviction proceeding:
The procedure should be swift and simple and easily invoked. It should be
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims. In light
of Fay v. Noia, it should eschew rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture,
waiver, or default. It should provide for full fact hearings to resolve disputed
factual issues, and for compilation of a record to enable federal courts to
determine the sufficiency of those hearing. It should provide for decisions
supported by opinions, or fact findings and conclusions of law, which disclose
the grounds of decision and the resolution of disputed facts. Provision of counsel
to represent prisoners, as in § 4 of the Nebraska Act, would enhance the
probability of effective presentation and a proper disposition of prisoners'
claims.7
14
Additionally, the plaintiff must have a reasonable opportunity to have the claim
discovered, heard, and determined by the state court.
71 5
Ohio's post-conviction procedures, found in section 2953.21 of the Ohio
Revised Code, resemble these requirements in theory through the provision of
numerous guarantees. Section 2953.21 provides for the filing of a petition
requesting that the petitioner's judgment or sentence be set aside.716 Unless the
pleadings filed show that "the petitioner is not entitled to relief," the petitioner is
to receive a hearing.7" 7 Moreover, a capital post-conviction petitioner is entitled to
appointed counsel to assist him or her in preparing the petition.71 '
In practice, however, the process afforded to the capital post-conviction
petitioner does not resemble Justice Brennan's ideals. A capital post-conviction
713 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
714 Id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
711 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955); Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 574
(1948).
716 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21 (A)(1) (West 1997).
717 Id. § 2953.21(E).
718 Id. § 2953.21(I)(1).
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petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing until he or she produces
sufficient documentary evidence dehors the record to show that he or she is
entitled to relief 7 9 However, a capital post-conviction petitioner has no right to
discovery until he or she establishes entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. 2°
Access to the avenues required to develop materials necessary to secure the right
to a hearing are not made available until that hearing is granted.
Without access to discovery, most avenues to secure information to support
the capital post-conviction petition have been cut off. Public records requests
were once a fruitful source of much needed extra-record materials.7 11 In State ex.
rel Steclnan v. Jackson,722 however, the Supreme Court of Ohio precluded the
criminal appellant access to such materials. In denying this access, the court
specifically noted that "[d]eath penalty cases now routinely include, at some
point, [a section] 149.43 demand," which can add "up to two years to the delay in
final determination of these cases. 723 Concerned with fairness to the prosecution,
which does not have a "reciprocal right... to obtain additional discovery beyond
[Criminal Rule] 16(C)," the court ruled that a criminal defendant may only use
Criminal Rule 16 to secure discovery materials.724 It is apparent that Steckman
was aimed--at least in part--at limiting capital post-conviction petitioners'
ability to pursue post-conviction relief.
The statute's promise of counsel is as hollow as its promise of a hearing. The
capital post-conviction petitioner's statutory right to appointed post-conviction
counsel is rarely honored. Moreover, even if counsel is appointed, the funding
available is deplorable. In Cuyahoga County, a post-conviction counsel receives a
maximum of $100.00 where there is no evidentiary hearing and a maximum of
$170.00 where there is an evidentiary hearing.725 In Franklin County, a post-
conviction counsel receives a flat fee of $150.00, regardless of whether there is an
evidentiary hearing. 726 In less populous Stark County, post-conviction counsel's
fees are $300.00 without a hearing and $750.00 when a hearing is granted.727
Even Stark County's significantly increased fees will not go far when counsel is
to receive $30.00 an hour for out-of-court work and $40.00 an hour for work done
719 State v. Kapper, 448 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ohio 1983); State v. Cole, 443 N.E.2d 169, 171
(Ohio 1982); State v. Jackson, 413 N.E.2d 819, 822-23 (Ohio 1982).
720 State v. Zuem, No. B-842052, 1991 WL 256497, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1991);
State v. Smith, 506 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1986).
721 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 1997).
722 639 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1994).
723 Id. at 89.
724 Id. at 90.
725 OHIO CT. C.P.R. 33(B).
726 OHIO CT. C.P.R. 77.04.
727 OHIO CT. C.P.R. 17.02.
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in court."' If counsel is appointed, he or she will be paid for only minimal work
on a capital post-conviction case. This puts counsel in an ethical quandary
because their financial interests are pitted against the client's interests. If counsel
does the necessary work, he or she will not be paid. Alternatively, if counsel does
not do the work, his or her client's constitutional rights will be forfeited.
The implications of Ohio's post-conviction process can be easily assessed by
the progress of capital post-conviction cases in Ohio's courts. As of April 2000,
219 capital post-conviction petitions were filed. Relief has only been granted one
time.7 29 Thus, there is less than a one percent reversal rate. Moreover, post-
conviction petitioners have submitted 120 Memorandums in Support of
Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The court has yet to grant review in a
capital post-conviction case.73 °
The outlook for success on a capital post-conviction petition is dismal.
Moreover, the capital defendant has no recourse against ineffective post-
conviction counsel under Ohio's statute T73 or the Federal Constitution.732 Post-
conviction appeals must be done right the first time or the client will face a losing
battle. To that end, the defense practitioner should investigate and present all
claims available when filing the petition. Furthermore, the Ohio Public Defender
has centralized available resources, which capital post-conviction counsel should
take advantage of when needed. The defense practitioner should also file motions
for discovery, funds for experts, and a request for an evidentiary hearing to
preserve avenues for fact development in federal court.733 Finally, the defense
practitioner should continue to assert the futility of Ohio's post-conviction
procedures. Indeed, the post-conviction process in Ohio clearly does not function
in an equitable manner and, as evidence to support this continues to mount,
appellate courts will have to act to rectify the problems.
728 Id.
729 State v. Barnes, No. CR83-5911 (Ohio C.P. Lucas County May 17, 1991).
730 OHIO SUP. CT. R. PRAc. III.
731 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.210)(2) (West 1997) ("The ineffectiveness or
incompetence of counsel during proceedings under this section does not constitute grounds for
relief in a proceeding under this section, in an appeal of any action under this section, or in an
application to reopen a direct appeal.").
712 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987).
731 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
The defense practitioner representing a capital client is in a truly unique
position. The client entrusts to the practitioner his or her very life. By accepting
that responsibility, the defense practitioner owes exceptional vigilance to the
capital client. We believe the client-and society as a whole-are best served by
defense practitioners that are informed, skilled, and ardent in their representation
of the capital client.
The defense practitioner should recognize "the good" in Ohio's death penalty
framework. In addition, the practitioner should know what statutory provisions
assist the client and utilize them. Moreover, the defense practitioner should be
familiar with "the bad" and "the ugly." Through awareness of the statutory
obstacles at trial and on appeal, the practitioner can better represent the capital
client. The gravity and finality of the death penalty requires exceptional attention
to detail. Nevertheless, knowing "the good," "the bad," and "the ugly" is just the
beginning.

